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This study of civil-military relations treats the parallel development of:  a.) the 
professional soldier and the Prussian-German army in the era from 1806 until 1945, as 
well as; b.) the rise of nationalism in central European politics and society, which 
culminated in the union of the professional soldier and National Socialism after 1933. 
These two political phenomena of modern Europe, in the first instance, the army, and in 
the second instance, voelkisch nationalism became a deadly combination in the Germany 
of the era 1914-1933.  The abdication of the monarchy in 1918 forced the professional 
soldier to look for a substitute sovereign, who would insure the survival of the privileged 
role of the soldier in republican state and society.  This study provides case studies of 
civil-military episodes in German history from 1806-1944, where civilian control and 
liberal oversight of the aristocratic military structure might have been possible, but liberal 
and socialist forces squandered the opportunities at hand.  This study counter poses 
episodes of civil-military conflict in the Prussian German past, with an analysis of the 
origins and character of integral nationalism and National Socialism. In particular, the 
study analyzes the ideological effort to influence the Reichswehr during the Weimar 
Republic. The missed civil-military opportunities for democratic forces in the 1920s 
resulted in the culmination of political, military, and socio-economic conditions ideal for 
the National Socialists in their quest for power.  This failure of important political-
military reform set the stage for interwar cooperation between military and the Nazis. The 
National Socialists wanted to make the army an instrument of power via a ‘bottom up’ 
revolution to subjugate the military command structure. This study speaks to this 
historical series of case studies within the general analysis of democratic civil-military 
relations. The failure of liberal and later democratic forces to integrate the military into 
constitutional mechanisms stands as one of the more grievous catastrophes of the story of 
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This thesis will concentrate on the parallel development of two political 
phenomena:  the Prussian-German army of dynastic heritage and the force of German 
nationalism, a phenomenon of the 19th century. As such, this study speaks to the 
fundamental issue of the soldier and politics in the 20th century world of total war, a 
matter which has lost none of its importance in a new century faced with the revival of 
war and mass politics.  In particular, emphasis here falls on the rise of mass political 
movements and on fascism in particular. These forces collided in the in post-World War I 
Germany.  These two features of politics and society encountered one another fatefully in 
the Germany of the 1920s, as the collapse of the monarchy forced the military to look for 
a substitute to insure the survival of its privileged role in society.  
This study comprises four case studies of failed civil-military reform and 
chronicles the struggle of the monarch and the aristocracy to forestall the spread of 
liberalism and democracy. Thereby did soldiers thwart the evolution from a dynastic, 
absolutist continental Europe to a liberal, democratic, citizen-army integrated into a 
workable German constitution.  These episodes of Prussian-German history are those of 
1808-1819, i.e. the period of the Prussian state reform and the anti-Napoleon coalition; 
1848 and the failed attempt at Frankfurt to unify Germany by peaceful means; 1860-1866 
and the statecraft of blood and iron of Otto von Bismarck, that unified the nation via the 
dynastic manipulation of mass politics; and 1918-1920, wherein the first German republic 
made a deal with the officer corps to the detriment of progressive forces.  Interspersed 
between these case studies is the parallel development of the origins of fascism with 
reference to the various philosophical views and opinions espoused in the Enlightenment, 
the Romantic periods and the Industrial age.  These views are the foundations of 20th 
century fascism and its ideological effort to influence the Reichswehr during the Weimar 
Republic.  This democratic failure of important military reform set the stage for interwar 
cooperation between military and fascist elements as the former saw in the latter the 
ability to restore past privilege while the latter viewed the former as a method to assume 
power and control over the state.   
2 
A. OFFICER CORPS 
Probably no country has had a wider variety of experiences in civil-
military relations than modern Germany.  No other officer corps achieved 
such high standards of professionalism, and the officer corps of no other 
major power was in the end so completely prostituted.  Each chapter of the 
German story has its lesson and its warning.1 
The refusal of the Prusso-German officer corps to accept the emerging trend 
towards social emancipation of the masses and the individual rights associated with 
democratic principles, created the conditions over the following hundred years under 
which the military finally turned toward National Socialism to maintain its privileged 
position within society in the age of total war and integral nationalism.     
The ethos of the Prussian nobleman in arms stood in fundamental conflict 
with the principles of liberty, equality, and fraternity that were gaining 
adherents elsewhere.  Closed off from other social groups, Prussian-
German officers nurtured a common worldview that was increasingly at 
odds with the world beyond the barracks and the officer’s mess.2 
This study illustrates the establishment and foundation of the ‘bunker mentality’ 
of the Prusso-German general staff to change associated with liberal democracy and its 
history of successfully avoiding significant reform until after the defeat of World War I 
forced an uneasy alliance with the Weimar government.  When faced with choosing 
either the futility of latching on to old traditions or becoming a professional organization 
upholding democratic principles, the Prusso-German general staff choose a radical third 
option.  
The military elite failed to take the potential way out, which it might have, 
in changing from an elite--both professional and political--to a purely 
professional one of military specialist.3 
This choice resulted in the officer corps attempting to retain its traditional 
privileged role within a growing antiquated hieratical system at all cost and by any means 
necessary.  The General Staff finally embraced the authoritarian right wing National 
                                                 
1 Samuel P Huntington, The Soldier And The State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military 
Relations, 98 
2 Donald Abenheim, Reforging the Iron Cross: The Search for Tradition in the West German Armed 
Forces, 14 
3 Klaus-Jurgen Müller, The Army, Politics and Society in Germany, 1933-45, 23 
3 
Socialist with their appealing mass following, to legitimize their continued survival and 
again avoid democratic reform.  The ability of the Prussian aristocracy to evade 
significant political change (even after the abdication of the monarch) had disastrous 
consequences and contributed greatly to two world wars. 
 
B. OFFICERS SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP TO CROWN 
The late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries witnessed the beginning of the 
end of the dynastic absolutist state.  The bond between the officer and the dynastic ruler 
represented the divine right of the king to rule and, the aristocracy to assist this rule by 
providing the officer class.   
The rise of the Prussian army, with its officer corps drawn from the landed 
nobility, hindered the formation of a liberal democratic society in 
Germany.4 
The social organization that espoused the belief that the officer class was better 
than the citizen class in the art of war because of their uncompromised stature, was 
beginning to be challenged by the new ideas of the Enlightenment period.  The status quo 
the privileged had enjoyed for the past hundred plus years increasingly found itself under 
pressure from a combination of social and political events. 
Ideas of citizenship, democracy, and representative government challenged the 
beliefs of the crown and the aristocracy who enforced the king’s rule.  The advent of the 
industrial age and the Enlightenment period strained the relationship between the king 
and his subjects.  The French revolution, combined with the rise of the citizen solider 
under Napoleon (levee en masse) spread fear throughout the courts of Europe as peasants 
increased their demand for representative rights.5  
Monarchs who had previously relied on mercenary armies were reluctant to train 
and arm the masses for fear of their weapons being turned against them.  Over the next 
two centuries, the citizen solider emerged, via foreign and domestic crises, to first claim 
his place as a citizen solider and then as a member of the officer corps.  This transition 
                                                 
4 Donald Abenheim, Reforging the Iron Cross: The Search for Tradition in the West German Armed 
Forces, 14 
5 Hagen Schulze, States, Nations and Nationalism, 66 
4 
from a dynastic absolutist state to the incorporation of peasants into the military, and 
finally, the officer corps was bitterly opposed by the monarch and aristocracy in Germany 
during the 19th century.   
The emergence of the officer corps as an autonomous professional 
body…was gradual and faltering, however, Prior to 1800 there was no 
such thing as a professional officer corps.  In 1900 such bodies existed in 
virtually all major countries.6 
 
C. EMERGING POLITICAL IDEAS: LIBERALISM, NATIONALISM, 
INTEGRAL NATIONALISM 
The growing popularity of emerging political thoughts and ideas (Nationalism, 
Social Darwinism and Racism), with origins based in the French Revolution, forever 
changed the political landscape of Europe.  These concepts matured by the late 19th 
century into disenfranchisement over control of government and politics by the ruling 
class and/or social elites of the old and new stripes.  This growing trend involved artists, 
intellectuals, and political thinkers who rejected the philosophical emphasis on rationality 
and progress that was characteristic of the enlightenment period.   
Fascist and national socialist ideas were formulated by French, German, 
and Italian philosophers and ideologues and embodied in right-wing 
populist movements.7 
These socio-political trends resulted in mass political movements attempting to 
unite people under a new type of nation and eliminate class and social divisions.  The 
foundation for this movement was anchored in nationalism and racism with a strong 
support for vitalism and irrationality and would eventually coalesce into an ideological 
doctrine of vengeful Fascism that emerged in post-World War I Germany.   
The ideas of nationalism, communism, and fascism reached Central and 
Eastern Europe in the last decades of the nineteenth century, just as the 
failure or semi-failure of modernization was manifesting itself.8 
                                                 
 6 Samuel P Huntington, The Soldier And The State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military 
Relations, 19 
7 Ivan T. Berend, Decades of Crisis: Central and Eastern Europe before World War II, 49 
8 Ivan T. Berend, Decades of Crisis: Central and Eastern Europe before World War II, 51 
5 
This study illustrates the history and significance of German nationalism in 
conjunction with the appeal of fascism in post-World War I Germany.  This study treats 
the reinvention and reinterpretation of German culture utilizing Social Darwinism and its 
implications, and when combined with aspects of race, mysticism, and religion, fueled 
the ulterior motives of fascism and racism.  Finally, the present work analyzes the appeal 
and spread of fascist ideology into the German armed forces before and after 1933.   
At the heart of German fascism there lay the idea of the superiority of the 
Germanic or Aryan race, along with the alleged ethic inferiority of the 
Jews.  Philosophers like Fichte, Arndt, Lagarde, and Treitschke gave 
German nationalism a spin, into which Hitler’s political thought may be 
fitted.9 
The most powerful “national socialist” ideology and organization emerged 
in Germany…[with] origins traced to early-nineteenth-century anti-liberal, 
nationalist German political philosophy and political economy.10 
These aforementioned theories and beliefs when adopted, combined and 
reinterpreted through right wing emotional extremism, over time evolved into the 
ideology of fascism.  Upon implementation after 1933, by the National Socialist Party, 
this overall reinterpretation of fundamental German ideas and concepts pushed the world 
towards the edge of destruction and into the most devastating conflict in human history.  
The assumption of state control was the initial platform of the Nazi leadership’s goal of 
‘righting the wrongs’ of World War I, and correcting the previous century of degradation 
and domination of their culture by capitalistic democracies, who denied them their 
rightful place.   
                                                 
9 Anthony Glees, The Origins and Development of the Fascist Right in Germany, 36 
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7 
II. EARLY NINETEENTH CENTURY: 1806-1866 
A. 1806-1819: PERIOD OF THE REFORMERS 
The German military tradition has always consisted of many diverse 
components that have never been easy to reconcile.   This long historical 
conflict…is but one aspect of the fragmented development of German 
politics, society, and culture.  The era of Prussian reform perhaps best 
illustrates this phenomenon of a fragmented military tradition.11 
In the aftermath of the embarrassing defeat at Jena and, the subsequent universal 
animosity towards the state and military, a series of reforms took place--starting in 1808 
and spanning a ten-year period.  However, the reformers were short lived, and the 
government, no longer facing outside pressure, reverted to its historical traditions, which 
resulted in the military again becoming the focal point for ‘popular resentment.’  
The establishment of a Military Reorganization Commission to investigate the 
1806 military debacle of Jena and Auerstadt provided the platform for the emergence of 
several reformers of these, two of them, one military and one civilian emerged to 
dominate the commission through a combination of their contrasting personalities and 
leadership styles.   
two men of extraordinary talents and vision, a civilian and a soldier, 
achieved a miracle.  In a very short time, and with little help from the 
crown, they succeeded in transforming a demoralized society and a beaten 
army until both were fit to fight again, and this time with a national 
consciousness never known before.  The irony was that neither of these 
men was a Prussian by birth nor ancestry.12 
Fate had brought these two reformers together.  They both realized the social 
relationship and the perception held by the citizens towards their king and army. Post-
Jena served as a wake up call to those officers attuned to the civil-military atmosphere in 
early 19th century Prussia.  The emergence of these two personalities, Gerhard von 
Scharnhorst and Baron Heinrich vom und zum Stein, to lead the reformers in the 
aftermath of the embarrassing military performance against Napoleon, provided a 
                                                 
11 Donald Abenheim, Reforging the Iron Cross: The Search for Tradition in the West German Armed 
Forces, 20 
12 Edward Crankshaw, Bismarck, 5 
8 
window of opportunity within the military and civilian sectors for “one of the most 
promising periods of reform in German history.”13   
The Prussian military reformers knew that new methods of war were an 
expression of the profound social and political changes that the French 
Revolution had produced.  The army of Frederick the Great had been a 
force of mercenaries isolated from civilian society.14  
Recognizing the miserable performance at Jena and Auerstadt as a failure of 
leadership, and more importantly, a lack of an institution that develops leadership, (e.g. 
institutions that bind the population to the government and army), intertwined their fates.  
Scharnhorst and Stein realized that the military and political structure of the past was 
inadequate and had contributed greatly to the failure of the masses to support the 
military/monarchy, viewing their fate as separate from their own.15  Scharnhorst and 
Stein recognized the following:  
the gulf, which existed between the state machine and the Prussian people, 
made it impossible for the people to identify themselves with their 
government and which deprived the state of popular support in time of 
crisis.16 
The masses viewed the state as an alien, occupying force of oppression loyal to 
the king, and, thus, confining them into ‘hereditary bondage;’ unworthy of their support 
(moral, religious and patriotic).  Scharnhorst and Stein recognized that radical reforms, 
both social and military were needed to reestablish the bond between citizen and 
country/king; thus, civilian and military initiatives were born to reawaken this bond and 




                                                 
13Gordon Craig, The Politics of the Prussian Army, 39 
14 Hajo Holborn, Makers of Modern Strategy, The Prusso-German School: Moltke and the Rise of the 
General Staff, 282 
15 Gordon Craig, The Politics of the Prussian Army, 40 
16 Gordon Craig, The Politics of the Prussian Army, 38 
9 
If it were necessary to give a precise date to the origin of the military 
profession, August 6, 1808 would have to be chosen.  On that day the 
Prussian government issued its decree on the appointment of officers, 
which set forth the basic standard of professionalism with 
uncompromising clarity17 
Significant among the reforms were the abolition of serfdom, the institution of 
local government, the opportunity for advancement in the ranks, establishment of a War 
Academy and General Staff, the formation of a Landwehr and militia, and a reduction in 
the brutality of military discipline.   These reforms were very controversial as they 
threatened the army’s historical role and relationship to the crown and directly challenged 
the established heritage/precedence of Frederic the Great.   
Frederic the Great was both admired and resented by the Prussian 
reformers of the early nineteenth century.  Many of the military reformers 
felt an emotional antagonism toward Frederick as the “symbol of the old 
Prussia that needed to be reshaped and modernized.” They admired his 
martial qualities and strategic genius, but rejected his political and social 
views: he represented a system of government that had outlived its 
usefulness.  The reformers wanted to break up the old absolutist system, 
which had inhibited the rational execution of public business, and to 
achieve a fuller exploitation by the state of social and psychological 
energies that the Frederician class structure had repressed.18 
The overriding goal of reformers was “a basic constitutional reform which, as a 
minimum, would bring a written constitution and some form of national 
representation.”19   Reformers believed that the “duty of military service should be 
balanced by the right to some share in the politics of the state…reformed army as a 
school for teaching the people how to bear civic responsibility.”20 Opponents viewed the 
constitutional change as having negative repercussions among other German states. 
Moving swiftly while the memory of Jena was still present, Scharnhorst and Stein 
sought to reorganize the army.  The importance of this plan was to “put an end to the 
                                                 
17 Samuel P Huntington, The Soldier And The State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military 
Relations, 30 
18 Donald Abenheim, Reforging the Iron Cross: The Search for Tradition in the West German Armed 
Forces, 21 
19 Gordon Craig, The Politics of the Prussian Army, 71 
20 Gordon Craig, The Politics of the Prussian Army, 71 
10 
aristocratic monopoly of the officer corps.”21 In order to accomplish this, they sought to 
open the officer corps to promising applicants of the middle class and establish 
educational standards, which would serve as the “decisive fact in securing a 
commission.”22 These proposals were dismissed out of hand by the aristocracy who 
claimed that,   
learning kills character [and would] destroy the intimate relationship 
…between sovereign and his officers.23 
Additionally, these reforms although bitterly opposed by the army, aristocracy 
and the king, (whose complacency and waffling were notorious), initially succeeded due 
in part to the prevailing attitude concerning the aristocracy’s embarrassing performance 
at Jena.   
In 1809 Scharnhorst reorganized the War Ministry, he created a special 
division that was charged with the plans for organization and mobilization 
and with the peacetime training and education of the army.24 
Thus, by 1810, with the exception of two remaining military schools, the rest had 
been replaced. ‘Old school’ officers regarded this as an attack on their class’ special 
position within the monarchy.  The overriding belief was echoed by General York who 
stated, “If your royal highness deprives me and my children of our rights, what 
foundation is left for your own,”25  growing sentiments of this type resulted in the royal 
order of March 1809, clarifying the king’s right to appoint officers, which in turn, 
implied to reformers the king’s intent to maintain his royal rights. 
Another proposed reform and its intention, was the formation of a civil guard 
where all qualified males not in the army would serve up to age 39.  This initiative was 
crucial to the beliefs of Scharnhorst and Stein who felt that “universality of responsibility 
for service in war”26 would bind the population to the government and army, thus 
                                                 
21 Gordon Craig, The Politics of the Prussian Army, 42 
22 Gordon Craig, The Politics of the Prussian Army, 43 
23 Gordon Craig, The Politics of the Prussian Army, 44 
24 Hajo Holborn, Makers of Modern Strategy, The Prusso-German School: Moltke and the Rise of the 
General Staff, 283 
25 Gordon Craig, The Politics of the Prussian Army, 44 
26 Gordon Craig, The Politics of the Prussian Army, 47 
11 
intertwining their fates.  This would also serve as a ‘school of the nation’ in which the 
indoctrination of citizens in regards to duty and country would transpire, while preparing 
them for “intelligent participation in public life.”27 Articles of war were drawn up which 
defined guidelines for discipline and greatly protected individual soldiers from harsh 
disciplinary and, often, arbitrary punishment.  The king continued to ‘waffle’ on 
recommendations for reform and viewed these proposed innovations as “dangerous 
French ideas”28 and potentially harmful to his authority. 
The king, during this period, demonstrated indecisiveness on several occasions in 
both domestic and foreign policy.  His passivity toward the French, by acquiescing to 
their demands in 1809, caused massive resignations in his officer corps, including Carl 
von Clausewitz.  Then in 1812, he signed the Franco-Prussian treaty; thus undermining 
the actions taken by reformers to strengthen the army since 1807.  These actions could 
have further destabilized the army if not for the war of liberation in 1813, which served 
as a testing ground for initiatives implemented by reformers.29 Gneisenau’s long held 
belief, shared by his fellow reformers, that once the masses had “saved the state [they] 
would be entitled to a constitution and all the other privileges of representative 
government,”30 seemed to be coming true. “Reforms which had been primarily designed 
to appease the bourgeoisie and to reconcile it to the army had achieved their purpose.”31 
However, while the reformers were treated as heroes, the manner in which some 
conducted themselves strained their relationship with the king, e.g. defiance of orders, the 
pursuit of nationalistic agendas that king had no interests in, etc.  This persistent attitude 
of some reformers also jeopardized respect for the king amongst fellow European rulers 
and, the Tsar even made reference of having to save the Prussian king from his army.32   
                                                 
27 Gordon Craig, The Politics of the Prussian Army, 48 
28 Gordon Craig, The Politics of the Prussian Army,  49 
29 Gordon Craig, The Politics of the Prussian Army, 60 
30 Gordon Craig, The Politics of the Prussian Army, 56 
31 Gordon Craig, The Politics of the Prussian Army, 62 
32 Gordon Craig, The Politics of the Prussian Army, 67 
12 
[Their actions] had made them [Scharnhorst, Stein and Gneisenau] suspect 
in the conservative atmosphere of the Prussian or, for that matter, of the 
Austrian and Russian courts.33 
The aristocracy and officer corps capitalized on these events and began to portray 
reformers as bringing revolution to the country and, that civil and military reforms would 
destroy the monarchy and upset the dynastic balance.  This created a war of the ‘property 
less against the propertied.’ The conflict between Wilhelm von Humboldt and Chancellor 
August von Hardenberg over the Landwehr, which was viewed by its critics as politically 
unreliable due to the perceived nationalist aspirations of its leaders, is but one example.  
Although the Landwehr’s performance was deified in the ‘War of Liberation’ and had 
been ‘praised at the expense of the line army,’ which was viewed as a ‘tool of despotism,’ 
by 1819 with its efficiency severely deteriorated by four years of peace; the time for the 
reaction party to make its move was at hand.  The reformers were outmaneuvered and the 
reaction party oversaw their removal through retirements and resignations; resulting in 
the reversal of their progress towards reconciliation of the army and civil society.34 
The dream of the Prussian military reformers of creating a true citizens 
army was frustrated by the political reaction after 1815.  The legacy of 
their strategic and tactical knowledge fared better, though even here the 
old school scored certain successes.35 
1. Analysis 
The great reforms of Scharnhorst, Gneisenau, Grolmann, and the Prussian 
Military Commission mark the true beginning of the military profession in 
the West.  The work of these leaders reflected an undercurrent of though, 
discussion, and writing which appeared in the Prussian Army in the last 
decade of the previous century and which burst forth after Jena.  This 
movement made a sharp break with the eighteenth century.36 
Prior to the emergence of the reformers, the aristocracy had a stranglehold on 
military education and subsequent appointment to the officer corps throughout Europe.  
                                                 
33 Hajo Holborn, Makers of Modern Strategy, The Prusso-German School: Moltke and the Rise of the 
General Staff, 285 
34 Gordon Craig, The Politics of the Prussian Army, 75 
35 Hajo Holborn, Makers of Modern Strategy, The Prusso-German School: Moltke and the Rise of the 
General Staff, 282 
36 Samuel P Huntington, The Soldier And The State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military 
Relations, 31 
13 
The few who had managed to penetrate the officer corps were specialist in their field, not 
leaders of men.   
Admission to the schools of preliminary military education, founded in 
both France and Prussia in the middle of the eighteenth century, was 
limited to aristocrats… In Prussia in 1806 there were only 700 non-nobles 
in a corps of 7,100 and virtually all of these were in the technical 
branches.37 
The actions of the reformers was to forever change the composition of the officer 
corps the reformers had utilized this unique opportunity of national defeat to implement 
the foundations of reform by allowing the middle class to become officers; further, the 
reforms established officer education standards, the Ministry of War department, and the 
General Staff, and amended military justice by abolishing corporal punishment.  These 
actions greatly contributed to the success enjoyed in the War of Liberation, such as: the 
performance of staff and middle class officers through various campaigns in 1813, the 
support of military and king by populace, and the administrative unity of the army.   
The spirit behind the new army, which proved itself at Lepzig in 1813 and 
then at Waterloo nearly two years later, was the spirit which had pushed 
through Stein’s domestic reforms, most notably the abolition of serfdom; 
and it was a spirit actively opposed by the traditional masters of Prussia, 
the Junker landowners, who had presided over their country’s humiliation 
and were soon most to benefit from its recovery.38 
However, these reforms were viewed by the army as an attempt by radicals to 
dilute their authority and rightful role in support of the crown’s divine authority and 
natural order.   
Scharnhorst and Gneisenau had been politicians as much as generals and 
their military reforms aimed directly at a reform of the whole life of the 
nation.39   
Therefore, the reformers were marginalized and suffered a reversal of fortune in 
1819 leading to the following serious setbacks: 
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Frederick William was free with promises of a constitution, but he 
managed to drift along with those promises unfulfilled for twenty-five 
uninspired years.40 
The revival of ‘old provincial estates’ dominated by landed aristocracy 
instead of the constitution.  The effect was a “renewal of the old alliance 
between the crown and the nobility against the social and political 
aspirations of the rest of the people”41 
There was also a recrudescence of the privileged position of the Prussian 
gentry in government and army, and the Junker class continued to 
monopolize the officers positions.42 
Social and education reforms weakened, [and  were] addressed again in 
1836 and the antipathy between the army and the people reemerged post 
1819.43 
Clausewitz’s critique of the growing narrowness and one-sided 
professionalism in the education of Prussian officers at this time indicated 
the shape of the continuing conflict between conservative and liberal 
forces in 1819. But before Clausewitz’s superiors acted on his 
memorandum, the course of politics in Germany led to the triumph of 
ultraconservatism over moderates and liberals.44 
This policy resulted in the middle and lower-classes beginning the process of an 
organized liberal movement and constitutional reform, and a desire for foreign policy to 
satisfy the nationalists’ ambitions for a unified nation.  The army’s actions only served to 
validate these actions.  The alliance with Austria was viewed as an attempt to suppress 
growing liberal agitation associated with emerging nationalistic and democratic 
movements, rather than fulfill national aspirations.  In addition, the army had begun to be 
viewed as a weapon for domestic suppression against citizens, rather than a defense 
against foreigners.  The result was that over the next 20 years, the progress Scharnhorst 
had made in reconciling military and civilian society had been destroyed; resulting in the 
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military, again, being viewed as the main barrier to social progress.45 Subsequently, the 
military continued to reinforce its entrenched position with actions that would have 
severe ramifications until the mid-twentieth century. 
The absolutist structure of the Prussian government, however, made it 
possible to divide military responsibility under the supreme command of 
the king.  In 1821, the chief of the general staff was made the highest 
advisor of the king in matters of warfare, while the War Ministry was 
restricted to the political and administrative control of the army.  This 
decision was of far-reaching consequence, since it enabled the general 
staff gradually to take a leading hand in military affairs, not merely after 
the outbreak of war, but also in the preparation and initial phase of a 
war.46 
This study now turns to the emerging groundswell of mass political ideas during 
the early nineteenth century and their coalescing and ensuing impact on social institutions 
by the end of the century. 
 
B. NATIONALISM AND FASCISM  
“New political tendencies have normally appeared earlier in France than in almost 
anywhere else in the world.”47 Zeev Sternhell claims that 
all the ideas found in fascism first appeared in France; the fusion of radical 
nationalism with revolutionary and semi-collectivist socio-economic 
aspiration first occurred there along with the rejection of 
parliamentarianism in support of nationalism.48  
The British Industrial revolution transformed the Western European core 
of the world economy.   Conjointly, the French Revolution prepared the 
ground for major sociopolitical changes.49 
Though the rationalist and equalitarian aspect of the French revolution 
would later be violently rejected by 20th century fascist, certain aspects of 
the fascist form of revolutionary nationalism were themselves pioneered in 
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the French revolution, new civic festivals and rituals; and formed its own 
cult of youth, patriotic death, and martyrdom.50   
Two linkages to 19th century France are identified as the origins of a fascist-type 
regime.  August Thalheimer and Otto Bauer developed a theory that fascism was an 
updated version of Bonapartism,51 while Ernst Nolte believed that ‘Action Francaise’ 
was the “beginning of fascism in Europe.”52  Some others believed that Bonapartism was 
the “first modern syncretic regime with fascist tendencies,”53 while still other groups felt 
that it “seemed more related to several of the right wing, primarily non-fascist systems of 
the period between the world wars.”54   
Many believe Action Francaise was the true origin, because it provided a truer 
reflection of modern fascism: 
achieved a new synthesis of all 19th century traditionalist ideas,  
combining them with radical nationalism, converting monarchism from a 
dynastic principle into a complete system of integral nationalism, 
authoritarian, anti-Semitic, exclusivist, and intolerance55  
Therefore, to understand the roots of fascism, we need to explore the theories and 
ideas and counter arguments from writers and intellectuals of the romantic era who 
disputed some of the beliefs of the enlightenment period. 
To truly understand fascism, you have to first comprehend nationalism and its 
perceived effect upon the hierarchy in Germany during the 19th century.  Nationalism 
“exerted one of the two or three strongest kinds of political appeals known to modern 
times.”56 Radical nationalism was first expressed in the Jacobin period of the French 
revolution and shared some of the characteristics of fascism; strong individual leader, 
justification of extreme violence, and the goal of achieving a new man and a new kind of 
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citizen.57 These characteristics coupled with aggressive tendencies, to not only preserve 
an idea or state, but also to defend and unite against common enemies; foreign and 
domestic, real or imagined, was the incubator for the indoctrination of xenophobic anti-
communist and racial prejudices espoused by fascism.  However,  
fascism could not become a major force in countries where a reasonable 
significant nationalist ideology or movement had not preceded it at least 
by half a generation, if not more.  Such radical and intense a doctrine 
could gain momentum only as the second stag in ongoing nationalist 
agitation and mobilization.58 
These conditions had developed throughout European society over the past 
generation and were becoming ever more vocal throughout the German states. 
In Germany and throughout northern and western Europe, the middle class 
promoted the founding of societies, association and pressure groups, rallying an 
increasingly large section of society behind national slogans, despite bans and obstruction 
efforts imposed by the authorities.59 However, it wasn’t until the Rhine crisis of 1840 that 
German nationalism first manifested itself significantly.  Hagen Schultz noted that this  
nationalism of the masses was manifested for the first time as a distinctive 
factor in politics, indeed as an issue of the utmost significance.60  
Further evidence of the merging of romantic ideas with mythical glories by the 
middle class is again highlighted by Schultz: 
the minds of the groups who propagated the idea of a German national 
state, for the most part the liberal middle class, had for generations past, 
been conditioned by images and myths of a regressive romantic utopian 
resurrection of alleged medieval glories of the empire.61  
Additionally, this period (1840) “represented a historical dividing line…it had 
now become obvious that there was no viable alternative to the nation state.”62 Max 
Weber argued that  
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the nation is not content to be merely the sum total of all its members:  the 
people are identical with the nation, which sees itself not just as a cultural, 
but also as a political entity.63  
Prussia served as a historical model for the goal of ‘uniting all Germans,’ and the 
rationalization of the German national state through the agency of Prussia was part of the 
‘divine cosmic order’; it is within the context of this struggle that the origins of German 
fascism are found. The German people believed in the 19th century that they were not 
suited to confinement in a fractured confederation of German states, but 
had been limited up to that point, because they cold not project their 
influence and political energies abroad.64  
By the 1880-90s the spread of nationalism in Germany society equated to the 
proliferation of numerous Germanic associations.  These organizations became more 
militant and aggressive in their avocation of authoritarian and racist policies to cure 
society’s ills.65  Max Nordau’s Entartung (Degeneration, 1892) helped fuel nationalism 
and imperialism as the cure for this decadence.66 
The people who most strongly promoted imperialistic adventure were the middle 
class and liberals, who were intent on expansion and global status for Germany.67 Thus, 
nationalism evolved into imperialism, when citizens urged their government to expand 
their power and influence beyond their boundaries, (e.g. goal of German unification) and 
compete for foreign empires.68   
The small continent of Europe seemed too cramped for the enormous 
economic and political potential that was being generated in Germany.  
This confinement within the scope of modest domestic developments and 
saturated markets was felt by German middle class as degrading and 
discriminatory in comparison to their European neighbors.69  
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Fascism and Nazism entailed a right-wing revolution of nations that had 
experienced a troubled and delayed process of national emancipation and 
that were unable to created their nation-states at the same time as a major 
Western powers.70 
These events paralleled the movement towards the political right, whose 
ideologies became increasingly more ‘aggressive, authoritarian, and intolerant’, 
challenging individual liberalism by the end of the century.  These escalating goals and 
ambitions of European nations eventually collided in the conflict know as World War I.  
However, before the Great War, a serious of uprisings and revolutions were fueled by the 
budding promise of these new socio-political forces.  1848 was a pivotal year for the 
European continent; Prussia and her Monarchy were not spared the turbulent forces of 
democracy sweeping Europe.  
Prussia initiated a professional officer corps after its defeat in 1806 and 
started a second wave of professionalization following its humiliation by 
Denmark in 1848.71 
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III. MID NINETEENTH CENTURY 
A. 1848: ROLE OF THE ARMY AND KING DURING POLITICAL UNREST 
after Waterloo the social and political (but not industrial) development of 
Prussia regressed until in 1848, the year of revolutions, the people took 
things into their own hands and came very close to overthrowing the 
dynasty.72 
The European Revolutions of 1848 signified the awakening of diverse populations 
to a national consciousness. These events forever changed the relationship of the German 
army, monarch, and the government.  Several factors combined, again, to present 
opportunities for the transformation of the Prussian army into an instrument of the state 
with allegiance to the constitution.  The rise of nationalism and the revolution in Paris 
spread to other European capitals and, contributed to the military’s violent repression to 
curtail ongoing riots.  The army’s belief in the inevitability of future domestic 
disturbances by forces of democracy and questionable reliability of the king promoted 
their ‘bunker mentality.’  The election of the National Assembly and, attempts by the left 
to replace the regular army with the Volkswehr, further promoted the belief in the 
jeopardy of the aristocracy’s divine military role.  The inability of liberals and democrats 
to, cooperate on reforming the army within a narrow window of opportunity, allowed the 
army to escape any significant reforms. 
In February of 1848, the overthrow of Louis Philippe [France], combined with the 
subsequent “conduct of the troops in the city [Berlin] and, the attitude of their leaders 
which precipitated the rising of 18 March,”73greatly contributed to the volatility of the 
situation.  The military overreaction towards civilians created a crisis in Berlin;  
where revolution in Prussia was inevitable or not, the men governing 
Prussia…did everything to make it so.74  
The army’s deployment of troops and their over enthusiastic use of force during 
riots to quell disturbances made the “uniform an object of hatred to working classes.”75  
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The army had for so long been detested as a symbol of absolutism and 
repression that it required no more than the least show of force to infuriate 
the crowds.76 
The army believed that the masses must be made to see that they can accomplish 
nothing against the military and, that the; 
significant characteristic of military thinking… remorseless employment 
of military force [was the] only means of preventing repetition of Paris 
experience in Berlin.77  
Thus, it had been military abuses, which had touched off the uprisings that took 
place in Berlin.  The result of this crisis was the solidification of opposing beliefs by the 
king and his closest military advisors against the middle and lower classes; the former 
being a “belief by the highest ranks of officer corps and especially among those officers 
closest to the king that ‘March days’ were the prelude to revolutionary renewal in the 
near future.”78 While the latter, inspired by nationalism and the burgeoning industrial 
revolution, felt the era of political and social reform was at hand.  
throughout the Germanies and Austria the real drive behind the 
revolutions came from the new middle classes: it was they who turned 
against absolutist rule, demanded a voice in government, and at the same 
time discovered in nationalism, in the concept of the nation of which they 
formed and indisputable part, a cause to set against the principle of 
aristocratic privilege that so evidently transcend all considerations of 
nationhood.79 
The after effects of 1848 resulted in the first elected National Assembly, where 
liberals dominated and attempted basic civil-military reform.  Their goal was to 
“transform the army into a body whose first allegiance would be to the constitution which 
they had undertaken to create.”80  However, the inability of liberals and democrats to 
work together gave the king and army time to recover.  ‘March days’ were significant in 
that they further widened the gulf between military and civilian society.  Illustrated by the 
belief that the retreat from Berlin was viewed as a defeat for officer corps; it increased 
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their attitude of arrogance and contempt when dealing with civilians.  The army was no 
longer viewed as a tool for foreign defense, via their capitulation to Austria and their 
Crimean War policy, but rather as an instrument of domestic oppression.  This belief was 
reaffirmed over the next ten years; as foreign policy was subservient to the maintenance 
of the army as a domestic police force. 
 
B. THE ROLE OF FREDRICK WILLIAM IV  
The aforementioned crisis served to alienate both the army and the population 
from their new leader who, had only a short time before, ascended the throne with so 
much promise.  The army’s perception of Frederick William IV was one of 
indecisiveness and lack of support.  Although, his statements seemed to fully support no 
reduction in their role;  
no power on earth, he said will ever force me to transform the natural 
relationship…between prince and people into a conventional 
constitutional one,”81 [and his beliefs;] “one of the few remaining rulers 
who sincerely believed in the diving right of kings.82  
Furthermore, his indecisiveness and lack of military bearing, combined with his 
‘February patent of 1847,’ contributed to a common belief by the army that he lacked the 
virtues of his forbearers.  While political reformers believed; 
that the King was a convinced absolutist at heart and that political and 
social progress would not be achieved with his help.  Once the king was 
recognized for what he was [his position], there came throughout the 
country, a definite hardening of opposition to the crown and weapons 
[army] with which it maintained its absolute authority.83 
This inactivity contributed to the growing unpopularity of the king by the middle 
and lower classes, who expected him to  
check the growing arrogance of army and officer corps,”84 which 
contributed greatly to the “dangerous antipathy which existed between the 
army and civil society.85 
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Several attempts by the Assembly to curtail the military’s influence further served 
to alienate the army, who believed the king’s response was not sufficient from their point 
of view.  The Assembly’s attempt to write a, “provision in constitutional draft for a 
formal oath of allegiance to the constitution to be taken by all officers”86 along with, 
efforts to purge all reactionary officers and, the resignation of those who disagreed with 
this action further threatened the army’s vaulted position.  Additionally, the creation of a 
civilian defense force [Burgewehr] was a “blow to the position of the army in the 
state.”87 This was followed by the king’s statement that once a constitution was drafted, 
the army would have to swear an oath to it.  In turn, the army felt they owed allegiance 
only to the king and were insulted by this statement.  Albrecht von Roon responded to 
this course of action in a letter to his wife where he stated: 
the army is now our fatherland, for there alone have the unclean and 
violent elements who put everything into turmoil failed to penetrate.88 
Officers believed that the king had abandoned the army by his concessions to the 
revolution, and despair soon fell over the army.  This was articulated by General von 
Thile, when he reminded the king that the “army was the only pillar upon which he could 
still securely lean.”89These events, along with attempts by the War Minister via the 
‘Frankfurt circular’ to unify the armies of Prussia and Central Germany under 
Reichsverweser supreme command, were the basis for the beginning of a conspiracy of a 
possible  military coup to restore the pre-March system. 
The concerns of the army and the radicalization of the Assembly’s proposals 
seemed to persuade the king to back the military.  This was demonstrated when further 
legislative attempts to have the ministers exert their influence over the military failed as 
they requested the king no longer directly communicate with commanders, but use the 
War Ministry, in effect bypassing civilian authority.  Instead, the king reversed positions 
and backed the army over the legislature, by stating:  
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that the extension of these principles to the army is justified by no 
constitution…the principle of complete royal authority in military affairs 
must be maintained in Prussia [this] cannot be conceived of without the 
absolute unity of the king with his army, because any infringement of that 
absolute unity would be the death sentence of Prussia at home and 
abroad.90 
These events, combined with the inability of the Assembly to decide on a course 
of action in regards to the army’s role and, disputes between members of the Assembly 
and representatives of the left prevented any cohesive decisions.  The former wanted 
military oath of allegiance to the constitution of the state and complete reorganization of 
the army, while the left, 
took the position that the time had come to abolish the regular army, 
which had been the source of so many of the countries ills, and to replace 
it by a genuine Volkswehr…which would be the surest the only guarantee 
of civil freedom.91 
The riots in Berlin began “the significant turning point in the history of the 
Prussian revolution of 1848,”92 and the restoration of imperial authority in Vienna; thus 
marking the turning of the tide of revolutionary fortunes in Germany.93 When General 
von Wrangle’s forces finally entered Berlin, they were hailed by the middle class who, 
“long weary of the insecurity and discomforts of a people’s revolution;”94 opted for the 
security and stability provided by the army. 
Thus, the political field began to shift from left to right as the middle class 
appetite for revolution was replaced by the desire for the security of pre-March period.  
The army was encouraged by this shift in public opinion and believed it validated their 
position and authority. 
The shift in public temper was encouraging to the army, and the first signs 
of a recovery from disillusionment and moral collapse of March became 
evident.95 
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The military went on the propaganda offensive by publishing the journal 
Deutsche-Wehrzeitung, for the purpose of fighting the ‘demon of revolution.’ In 
December, after nine months of turmoil and bickering, the National Assembly was 
dissolved by royal decree.  One result of these actions was the repeal of ‘universal 
suffrage’ and its 
replacement by a system which divided electors according to the amount 
of taxes they paid and made certain that the preponderance of seats in the 
chamber would be filled by representative of the wealthier classes.96 
1. Analysis 
Emerging European and German liberalism and nationalism threatened the 
absolutist divine order; citizens were beginning to believe that they no longer needed to 
swear allegiance to the crown and aristocracy, but to the concept of nation, culture and 
ethnic heritage.  These revolutionary beliefs prompted the army to adapt a ‘fortress 
mentality’ which resulted in the development of a ‘state within a state.’  Ironically, the 
army was saved by the middle class, who after a taste of revolution, feared that the 
instability and chaos would jeopardize their role and privilege in the state.  The army 
correctly foresaw the growing importance of nationalism and successfully co-opted it, 
helping to solidify the transfer of this political ideology from the left to the right during 
the next 50 years. 
By the late 1850s it was obvious that the drive towards closer union 
among the Germans could never be reversed: the cultural, linguistic and 
military impulses were now powerfully reinforced by the needs of industry 
and trade, which turned out to be the critical factor.97 
As a result of 1848; Prussia was transformed from an absolute to a constitutional 
state.  The constitution reaffirmed the principle of divine right monarchy, and the army 
once again escaped civilian control, (although the army was now in a position of having 
its budget approved by the lower house of parliament).   
Under the constitution, the Prusso-German army was an army of universal 
conscription.  Yet, it was [still] led by an officer corps which regarded 
itself not only as a professional but also as a social and political elite.  The 
officer corps was an integral part of the traditional social and political 
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leadership caste of the Prusso-German state.  It constituted a recognized 
group within the traditional, pre industrial ruling elite and shared its 
legitimating values.98 
The “army [was] left outside the constitution, subject only to the king’s control 
and serving to protect his authority against legislative encroachment.”99 
Military establishment was not forced to submit to any effective measure 
of civilian control.”100 “The critical question of the role of army in the 
state had been passed over in silence in the constitution of promulgated 5 
December 1848, although the king had once more intimated publicly that 
the army would take an oath to the constitution.101 
The king was the recipient of a flood of petitions from retired and active 
officers, Offiziersvereine and patriotic societies urging him to protect the 
army.  Article 108 of revised constitution of 1850 stated flatly that an oath 
by the army to the constitution will not take place; while articles 44-47 
reaffirmed the king’s powers of command and appointment in the 
army.102  
For his part, the king sensed that the constitutional struggle of 1848 was not a 
victory for the crown but an uneasy compromise.   
in the last analysis, the new constitution was an attempt to base a political 
system upon a marriage between an imperfect constitutionalism and an ill-
disguised absolutism.  The king was intelligent enough to doubt the 
workability of such, and experiment, even while he assented to it.103 
The king felt that the Minister of War had responsibility for administrative 
actions, while he, in his capacity as supreme commander of the army, reserved for 
himself all  military decisions. 
Thus, in the post-revolutionary period, the Minister of War became a 
living embodiment of fateful dualism, which characterized the new 
governmental system and his required appearance before parliament … 
provoked criticism of the army and political ideals for which it stood.104  
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C. IMPACT OF ROMANTICISM AND PHILOSOPHICAL IDEALISM  
The notion that the “impact of romanticism and philosophical idealism had a 
deeper impact in Germany” than on other European countries is widely held.   
“Romanticism discouraged rationalism and analysis in favor of emotion and 
idealism.”105 The convergence of these ideas with emerging nationalistic awareness, were 
the genesis of a new cultural thought, the ‘Völkisch culture,’ defined as ‘ethnic-nationalist 
culture.’ 
This new, intriguing culture interpretation was ‘mystical in tone,’ preaching  
unique values and truths for German people, which if properly developed,  
would raise Germany to eminence among the nations.106 
These traits were the reasons for the attractiveness to the German people they 
provided a sense of destiny for.  
For Germans to be truly free and capable of superior achievement, life and 
thought had to be thoroughly grounded in the Volk and purged of 
extraneous and corrupting influences, [e.g. ‘materialism, industrialization, 
urbanization] and the decadence associated with these influences.107  
This concept of decadence in the 19th century was voiced by Parisian 
literary elite in the last phase of classic romanticism during 1830-40s, and 
generalized in the second half of the century over mass urbanization and 
growth in crime.108 
Fascist strongly reflected the preoccupation with decadence in society and 
culture that had been growing since the mid 19th century. They believed 
that decadence could only be overcome through a revolutionary new 
culture led by the new elites, who would replace the old elites of 
liberalism and conservatism and the left.109  
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Germany could be truly liberated and capable of realizing its greater 
mission only by overcoming these pernicious effects and returning as 
much as possible to the soil.110   
Such historians as Heinrich von Treitschke and Heinrich von Sybel, began to 
elaborate on Völkisch theories and ideology.  These ideas were compiled during the last 
part of the 19th century by philosophers, Paul de Lagarde and Julius Langbehn.  
Consumption of these ideas by ‘middle class society’ insured the transference of a vague 
idea into a broad acceptance by the masses towards the concepts of this ideology.  
Therefore, Völkisch culture became the cultural foundation of German nationalism, 
supported increasingly by the middle class and segments of the intelligentsia who viewed 
the German state through an increasing skewed vantage point.111   
[The] nation as a higher historical force--the notion of superior political 
sovereignty--derived from the general will of the people and idea of 
inherent racial differences in human culture.112    
Nationalism and later fascism increasingly drew from the works of Henrich 
Luden’s ‘peoples empire’ and Johann Gottlob Fichte earlier observations that, “Germans 
were the most deserving of nations, and their culture was superior to all others”113  
[This] superiority of humanistic German culture, which was to culminate 
in the creation of a national state, was one of the grandiose historical 
ideologies of the day; another was the ‘myth of the German people’ 
suffused with a romantic sacred radiance.114 
 
D. RACISM AND RELIGION  
The combination, evolution, and interpretation of such new theories as; 
Darwinism, Social Darwinism,  scientism, and  eugenics was the ‘slippery slope’ that 
equated to; violence equals murder…equals genocide in the 20th century.115 
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Modern racial concepts originated amid the 18th century enlightenment, as 
geographers and anthropologists first make systematic attempts to 
categorize the diverse inhabitants of the earth.116 
Although the “first racial concepts were relatively benign,”117 they began to 
evolve in combination with other doctrines during the 19th century as the search for unity 
in nature was attracting more followers in the quest to associate, “the ideal and the 
physical, the cultural and the material, the spiritual and the biological and the natural and 
the social.”118   
In the second half of the nineteenth century, conservatism began to make 
common cause with nationalistic, populist, and ultimately with anti-
Semitic movements.119 
This resulted in the  
engineering of a variety of new theories involving pseudoscientific 
extrapolations from anthropology and zoology.  This new scientism 
encouraged concepts of race, elitism, hierarchy, and glorification of ‘war 
and violence’ throughout Europe.120  
Criminologist such as Lombroso 
developed anthropological and virtual racial definitions of criminal type, 
said to be rapidly increasingly in numbers.  The growth of racial doctrines 
produced fears of racial decay amid what were perceived as the expanding 
proportions of the déclassé and degraded sectors of society.121  
It is during this era that the  
term ‘anti-Semitism’ was coined by anti-Jewish writer Wilhelm Marr in 
the 1860s.  French aristocrat, Comte George Vacher de Lapouge, who 
extensively disseminated racial doctrines in France during the late 19th 
century, specifically demonized Jews, dangerous because of their internal 
roles within European society.122   
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The new theories of ‘scientific racism’ and ‘ mystical racism’ created 
sharp distinctions and categories among the various peoples of Europe, to 
establish the  absolute superiority of Aryan, Nordic, or Germanic 
Europeans as distinct from Slavs Latin’s, or Balkan people.123  
[The] Greatest advocate of mystical racism in Germany was Houston 
Stewart Chamberlain; he codified the new germanistic doctrines of 
mystical racism as earlier developed by Wagner and others.  He affirmed 
the existence of a special ‘race soul’ that created a more imaginative and 
profound sprit in Aryans and produced a ‘German religion,’ vaguely 
related to Christianity.  The ultimate anti-Aryan and most bitter racial foe 
was the Jew.  Chamberlain combined social Darwinism with racism and 
thus emphasized an endless racial struggle on behalf of purity of Aryanism 
and against Jews and lesser peoples, virtually crating a scenario for race 
war.124  
Adolf Hitler later adopted and espoused these extreme racist and social Darwinist 
ideas.  He re-elaborated these ideas he had ingested in earlier years into his book Mein 
Kampf.  His two main ideas being that of race and space, all history was a history of 
racial struggle.125 
[Hitler’s ideas] were partly rooted in modern scientism of German 
biological and zoological ideas of late 19th century and a keen interest in 
the occult, directed not toward superstitions but new modern and racial 
myths of the supernatural.126  
Social Darwinism was the beginning of scientific racism, and when combined 
with religious beliefs, concepts of mysticism and racial intolerance, resulted in an 
emerging dangerous and destructive ideology.   
During the 19th century, the belief of a mystical, intra-European Nordic heritage 
combined with religion and racism lead to the development of new ideas and religious 
theories.  The German philosophy of revolution and nationalism often mildly anti-Jewish 
became increasingly hostile with the embracing of these ‘mystical concepts of Nordic 
racism’ in the late 19th century.127 Stanley Payne noted that, 
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this combining of religion with the mystical concepts and doctrines of the 
occult encouraged and justified the incorporation of anti-Semitic ideas into 
religion and national culture.  These beliefs tended to be linked 
increasingly to racialist groups.128 
He also wrote that, “nonrationalist and/or pseudoscientisitic concepts merged into 
the remarkable rise of modern occult interest.” 129  The latter had grown rapidly from 
mid-century, and by 1900, counted untold millions of devotees in different cults and 
forms.  A significant form of occultism was put forth at the turn of the century by Guido 
von List and Jorg Lanz von Liebenfels who 
developed an ‘occult doctrine of ‘Ariosophy’ whose fundamental concepts 
involved a secret Aryan racial wisdom that guaranteed strength, purity, 
and racial superiority in ancient times but had been lost or 
contaminated.130  
This doctrine was instrumental in the partial foundation of Nazi ideology 
involving Arisophic occultism.  It facilitated fascism’s fundamental goal of attempting 
the creation of a new ‘civic religion.’ This system encompassed the myths of the 
‘structure of the state,’ regulating conventional religion to a “secondary status or none at 
all.”131 Many shared the emerging perception of this new religion, which believed that 
conventional churches are based on human ignorance and were an attempt to keep people 
ignorant and under control.132 
National Socialist and Christian conceptions are incompatible.  The 
Christian churches build upon men’s ignorance; by contrast, National 
Socialism rests upon scientific foundations.133 
The purpose of the Nazi Sacralization of ideology was not merely to 
achieve abstract belief, but rather to harness faith as a motivating engine 
for concrete action.134 
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These emerging beliefs, combining various theories on racism, mysticism, and 
occultism were the foundation for the ‘Ostara Society,’ which preached “extreme Nordic 
racism, anti Semitism, and cultural revolution.”135 Hitler would become an avid reader of 
their literature, and appears to have adopted their characteristics, of “occult symbols, 
rituals, and hidden lore” 136 into Nazi ideology and symbolism.  These pan-German, 
Aryan racial and intensely anti-Jewish attitudes formed the core of Hitler’s 
‘Weltanschauung.’  These concepts helped to initiate the revival of a mythical, racial, and 
nationalistic past.  They served to revise history and create a vision of this idealized 
legacy.  This radical social transformation was required to regain the heroic spirit of the 
past, destroyed by racial mixing (völkergemisch) and the nations restoration to former 
greatness.  These actions would ensure the creation of a unified culture within a new 
nation, eliminating deviant ideology and undesirable genetic traits.  
The idea of the nation had a quasi-religious undertone, since a nation has 
no visible physical presence, it has to be believed in, nationalism is the 
secular faith of the industrial age.  The new state was not sanctioned by 
god, but by the nation.137  
These new beliefs would become the foundation for the ‘political correct’ 
education of German youth under the Nazis.  They utilized the infrastructure of many 
prevalent organizations and societies within the German culture to indoctrinate the future 
generations of Germany with their drastically altered racial and religious views. 
The people must be increasingly wrested from the churches and their 
instruments, the priest.  Never again must the churches be allowed any 
influence over the leadership of the people.  This must be broken totally 
and forever.  Only then will the existence of nation and Reich be 
assured.138 
Belief in Hitler, in an increasingly religious, metaphysical sense of the 
term, was a central element in Nazi ideology.139 
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Fascist’s reinforced the mystical, by using ‘quasi-religious rituals, spectacular 
rallies, and mass media to generate mass support.  The creation of holidays and songs to 
celebrate martyrs, (i.e. Horst Wessel) significant events in the National Socialist German 
Workers Party (NSDAP} history, large-scale sporting events, and exhibitions were used 
to signify strength and accomplishment.  Life under fascism was meant to be historical, 
life-given, and beautiful,’ not empty and dull as with democracy.  These quasi-religious 
and racist theories coalesced into the ideology of Hitler’s vision of fascism 
All of Hitler’s political and social ideas had their origin in variants of the 
18th century enlightenment; the revolt against traditional culture in the 
name of revolutionary secularism, belief in a secular natural law, and a 
naturalistic Deist concept of god.  The rejection of traditional Christian 
concept of the unity of mankind in favor of racial division, and emphasis 
on combination of biological inequality and social equality, distinction 
between productive and unproductive, emphasis on people and the 
national group, Rousseauian general will of the people, optimistic belief in 
progress and a higher humanity and the cult of will—all of these Hitlerian 
beliefs were fundamental postulates in modern philosophy and culture.140  
 
E.  1860-1865 BISMARCK’S STATE CRAFT 
It was a blow of fate that in this moment of crisis the one man who was 
ready and able to defy parliament without formally abolishing the 
Constitution should have been waiting and ready in the wings.  The 
alternatives were abdication in favor of a liberally inclined crown prince, 
or military dictatorship at the hands of General Manteuffel.141 
This period saw the reemergence of the Prussian constitutional conflict between 
Parliament and Sovereign which would eventually become to be labeled as “the central 
event in domestic German history in the last 100 years.”142 The highlights of this period 
are; the tenacious attempt by Prussian liberalism to win significant influence over the 
military establishment, the renewed interest by liberals in foreign politics at the expense 
of domestic reforms, Otto von Bismarck’s strategy in dealing with the nationalistic 
objectives of both the military and parliament, and the collapse of a ‘united front’ by the 
liberals. 
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These attempts failed for two reasons: partially because of Bismarck’s 
appointment to the position of President Minister and his advocacy of the ‘royal cause,’ 
and the liberals’ continued inability to coordinate their goals; along with their desire for 
‘national greatness’ at the expense of domestic reforms.143  However, the military was 
again unable to accomplish their goal of defeating the liberals by terminating the 
constitution and returning Prussia to an absolute system.  The pivotal role in denying both 
the army and the liberals their overall objectives was the skillful diplomacy of Bismarck, 
who maneuvered the country through his position of President Minister in the direction 
he felt best suited Prussia and Germany’s national interest.   
During this period, the army was greatly influenced by two individuals: Roon, a 
realist who saw the expansion of Germany’s European interest through military power, 
and Edwin von Manteuffel, an unwavering absolutist who felt the revolution of 1848 
should have been crushed by force.  Thus, the military’s hard-line view during this 
period, both in domestic and foreign affairs, was a result of their perceived failure to 
completely crush the revolution in 1848.  Roon’s preference of a well-trained, 
professional army and disregard for the Landwehr brought him into conflict with the new 
Minister of War, Eduard von Bonin.  Roon proposed the elimination of the Landwehr as 
a ‘separate arm’ of the military and advocated its absorption into the line force where it 
would be commanded by professional officers.  He strongly believed the Landwehr 
“represented the main drag upon the efficiency of the Prussian army,”144 and, was both 
‘politically and military false’ because it no longer impressed foreign adversaries and, 
lacked proper discipline.  Bonin, along with the liberals, disagreed with Roon’s views for 
two different reasons: first, Bonin viewed an attempt to reduce power of Landwehr as 
detrimental due to its popularity; and furthermore, he believed if Roon’s memorandum 
was implemented, 
it would separate the army from the country and create a situation in 
which Prussia would lose the essential condition of her existence, namely, 
the confidence of the people in the army.145  
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Secondly, the liberals were believers in the Landwehr’s military ability, and by 
attempting to reduce its power; the government/army was trying to destroy the 
foundation/framework of the people’s liberty.  These views collided with Roon’s, and 
coupled with Bonin’s procrastination and inability to influence the crown, along with the 
manpower requirements in light of the Italian war, played into the hands of his enemies 
on the court who sought his removal, chief among them was Manteuffel (who opposed 
Bonin due to his interpretations of the role of his office).  Thus, his enemies were able to 
taint his reputation and cast doubts on his abilities in the eyes of the king.  This political 
maneuvering by the army resulted in the resignation of Bonin and his replacement by 
Roon.  Roon’s accession to the Minister of War office reassured the army that the powers 
of the office would not be used to weaken royal power and place restrictions on the army, 
as Roon’s “loyalty to the sovereign superseded all others.”146  Thus, with the king’s 
dedication ceremony at the tomb of Frederick the Great, “the future organization of the 
army and the fate of the Landwehr had, in effect, been decided by a royal fait 
accompli.”147 
In 1862, Bismarck became Minister President and began a delicate balancing act 
between three different players, (the military, the crown, and the parliament), to find “an 
arrangement which might remove the current stalemate,”148 over military budget and, end 
strength debate in parliament.  Bismarck had a clear vision of where he wanted to lead 
Germany and deftly maneuvered these competing interests to accomplish what he felt, in 
the end, was best for Prussia; the unification of Germany.  One of his significant goals 
was to reach some sort of reconciliation with parliamentary opposition,  
an understanding with the majority of the deputies, which will not at the 
same time, prejudice the future authority and governmental powers of the 
crown or endanger the proficiency of the army.149  
Bismarck’s ability to negotiate with the Chamber was hampered by several 
situations:  liberal suspicions and the king’s attitude and stubbornness (encouraged by 
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military advisors who were also suspicious of Bismarck’s motives), which prevented him 
from freely negotiating with the deputies.  
At this time, Parliament was consistently trying to limit the size of the army, as 
well as cut their budget.  Bismarck believed this was because of the memory of 1848 and 
their lingering belief that the military’s role was for the oppression of domestic liberty 
and rights. 
fixed liberal belief that the government had no intention of using the 
augmented forces for any but domestic purposes.150  
Bismarck realized a foreign war would demonstrate the military’s willingness to 
use troops abroad; and not solely for domestic repression.  However, in order to 
accomplish this, he needed funding to facilitate the build-up of military force.  Bismarck 
and Roon thus conceived the ‘Army Service bill,’ which satisfied numerous interest 
groups in regards to its position on service, taxes, and budget control.  This plan was 
sabotaged by Manteuffel’s interference and, in part, because of the king’s position that he 
alone had decision power on size, organization and command, and that the chamber had 
only a budgetary right when it came to military affairs.151 Thus, because of military 
interference, Bismarck was forced to be “more of a royalist than the king”152 and 
informed the chamber that if they  
persisted in its refusal to vote funds… we will take the money where we 
find it…he proceeded to demonstrated that this could be done without 
difficulty.153  
In January of 1864, when the opportunity for foreign war presented itself in the 
Schleswig-Holstein crises with Denmark, Bismarck capitalized on this confrontation to 
skillfully quiet parliamentary and liberal opposition.  Ironically, the increasing liberal call 
for military intervention in the Danish crises provided Bismarck the opportunity to 
validate his proposed military expenditures, unite the people, and quiet domestic turmoil 
(‘wag the dog’ scenario). 
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The Prussian liberals who wanted to march to the aid of their ‘northern 
brothers’ were stricken by the awful thought that in this noblest of causes 
they were demanding military actions from the very man to who they were 
so furiously denying the means of military actions.154 
1. Analysis 
“In the constitutional conflict of the 1860’s, the army had been saved from a 
determined effort on the part of the middle-class liberals to subject it to civilian 
control.”155 Once again, victory in foreign war and the ensuing patriotism had saved the 
army from any democratic civil-military reforms.  Bismarck’s belief in the unifying 
effects of a successful foreign victory proved true.   
Bismarck had long held that, if they were given a foreign success 
sufficiently striking to inflate their self-esteem, the Prussian people would 
forget their internal grievances; and this proved true.156 
Bismarck, over the next two years was able through military victory and deft 
political maneuvering, to swing the liberals and middle class to his position, and was 
eventually able to persuade the Chamber to pass a budget law referred to as ‘the Claudine 
yoke of Prussian liberalism.’ The ability of Bismarck to convert so many former 
opponents through the use of patriotism was commented on by Wilhelm Liebknecht, who 
stated: 
the oppressors of yesterday are the saviors of today; right has become 
wrong and wrong right. Blood appears, indeed, to be a special elixir, for 
the angel of darkness has become the angel of light before whom the 
people lie in the dust and adore.  The stigma of violation of the 
constitution has been washed form his brow, and in its place the halo of 
glory rings his laurelled head.157 
Bismarck had become the champion of universal suffrage, and this 
principle becomes the basis of the constitutional arrangements of 1867 and 
1871.158 
Bismarck’s efforts would carry over and bear fruit in the three wars of German 
unification.  By 1871,                                                   
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the German empire was well on the way to becoming the leading 
industrial power in Europe and was scarcely matched anywhere in the 
modernity of its economic and scientific achievement.159 
The political and military impotence was about to change as the successful 
unification and establishment of economic and industrial might resulted in, “German 
politics since 1890s meant world politics.”160 The success of industrialization and 
unification under Bismarck created another fundamental problem that would continue to 
cause military and government leaders problems until the mid-twentieth century.  
The fact that Germany’s industrial revolution coincided with the founding 
of the state under the leadership of a still feudal Prussia left the new nation 
with a problem fundamental to is existence: that of integration.161  
The problem of integration thus became an essential, if not decisive, 
structural feature of the Prusso-German nation state.162 
These evolving socio-political movements and ideas were foreign to the army, 
and presented integration problems with numerous evolving segments of society.  
However,  
The most effective instrument of the national integration of Germany as a 
‘retarded nation state’ (Helmut Plessner) was certainly the army [taking 
the place of the middle class, in the late 19th century; however, after World 
War I, the middle class reemerged].  The army regarded itself as the sole 
guardian of the state and the monarch, not just against foreign aggressors, 
but also against the enemy within, the Social Democrats, Catholics an 
Liberals.163 
Hitler would later solve this problem by using fascism to integrate Germany and 
‘silence’ the enemy within. 
 
F. FIN DE SIÈCLE:  INTELLECTUAL CRISES OF 1890S 
This generation of the late 19th century saw the challenge to longstanding  ideas 
concerning culture, spiritual, and racial norms, along with the impact of the ‘second 
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industrial revolution’ and rapid expansion of new and improved means of travel and 
communication.164  These advancements along with an increase in the urbanization of 
politics and media led to a new ‘visual age.’ French writer Charles Peguy noted in 1900 
that “more had changed in thirty years than in the past two thousand.”165    
The roots of fascism lay in the innovations of the late 19th and early 
20th’centuries, and particularly in the new doctrines and concepts 
produced by the cultural changes of the 1890s and the years that 
immediately followed.166  
This change had also encompassed thought, whereas ideas of “liberalism in 
politics, materialism and science in culture,”167 were being rejected by segments of the 
late 19th century generation. New concepts of “subjectivism, emotionalism, 
nonrationlism, and vitalism”168 were being embraced in an attempt to reverse the values 
of an earlier generation.  This period is recalled as the “intellectual crisis of the 
1890s.”169 Such men as Friedrich Nietzsche rejected 19th century ‘materialism and 
rationalism,’ equating “modern democracy and collectivism with herd psychology.”170 
Instead, his concepts of an elite race, “will to power, the master race, the superman, the 
blonde beast and triumph of the strong nations over the weak”171 fueled irrational and 
elitist theories.   
The Romantic ideal was of man unified in thought and action or will, as 
contrasted with the Enlightment abstract vision of the pure intellectual or 
disinterested Scientist.  Friedrich Nietzsche’s conceptions of human nature 
a exhibiting a will to power and of the superman, who expresses it to the 
highest degree, especially influenced Hitler’s idea of he Ubermensch.172 
This period is known as the ‘fin de siecle,’ and was a time of extraordinary 
changes in industry, technology, cultural and thought, which gave rise to new ideas and 
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theories that challenged or repudiated the status quo of earlier generations.173  Politics 
were no different as they took on a new meaning and urgency to eradicate social decay 
associated with the theory of Social Darwinism.  
Politics, meaning war, and war was needed to incinerate the evils of the 
new age, which ranged from individualism to socialism, so that a nation 
might arise rejuvenated from the ashes.174  
This was a very popular view in newspapers and periodicals between 1880-1914, 
and not just the ranting of a ‘handful of extremists.’  In fact, these views “provided the 
nucleus of Social Darwinism that sustained popular nationalism”175 during this volatile 
period. 
Hitler was influenced above all, by the theories of the nineteenth-century 
social Darwinist school--whose conception of man as biological material 
was bound up with impulses towards a planned society.  He was 
convinced that the race was disintegrating, deteriorating through faulty 
breeding as a result of a liberally tinged promiscuity that was vitiating the 
nation’s blood.176 
The military was not immune to social changes and found itself increasingly 
being influenced by a mixture of the rising tide of nationalism coupled with Social 
Darwinism.  General Friedrich von Bernhardi would publish ‘Germany and the next War’ 
in 1912 which strongly  
exhorted politicians to look on war as a ‘moral necessity,’ which would 
purge the nation and lead it on to its higher destiny.177 
France contributed greatly to new ideas and rationales debated during this period.  
Georges Sorel advocated the restructuring of socialism to overcome the current 
‘decadence’ of Marxism.  This, in his opinion, required action in three dimensions:  
Economic--acceptance and affirmation of free market; cultural--
motivating power of idealism and myth, and; political--rejection of 
parliamentary trap of liberal democracy.178  
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Sorel also “emphasized the moral character of violence…important to generate a 
sense of seriousness, commitment, purpose, solidarity, and common bonding.”179  
He additionally stated that  
violence was a creative aspect of group conflict that…..was good in itself, 
creating something unavailable through any other experience.180  
Sorel advocated the rejection of materialism and rationalism, in order to establish 
“heroic pessimism that built heroism, sacrifice and asceticism.”181 His doctrines on non-
rational approaches to social organization (myths, symbolism, and emotive appeals) 
found disciples throughout Europe.  Gustave Le Bon viewed crowds as “irrational in 
behavior and...mass hysteria,”182 concluding the need for strong leadership in society.  
Max Weber believed ‘charismatic leadership’ was the necessary alternative to 
“stultification of government by bureaucratic mediocrity.”183 These beliefs were the first 
“clear theoretical statement of a doctrine fundamental to fascist theory.”184  
Emerging in Germany and Austria at this time were, increased interest in 
“vitalism and holism in biology and psychiatry,”185 leading to social concepts of 
“wholeness and oneness.”186  In Italy, a revolt against positivism and a rejection of 
rationalism and parliamentary systems was unfolding.  Theorist Pareto denounced 
“democracy and socialism as myths” and believed politics “rested on emotion, thus 
requiring an enlightened system of stronger authority.”187 Music, literature, and the arts 
also began to reject the realism of 19th century culture, and turned towards more 
Neoromantic ideas.  Works by German composer Richard Wagner began creating a 
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“mystic world of Germanic past that exalted instinctive forces and tragic heroism.”188 Art 
began to represent internal and emotive forces through the rejection of realism and the 
embrace of expressionism and abstraction.  These views and beliefs were effectively used 
to add credibility to the militaristic views and necessity for political violence exposed and 
exploited by National Socialism after World War I.  The Nazis would place an emphasis 
on masculinity in art and culture; they “mobilized people through elaborate public 
ceremonies and visual arts, and mass culture.”189  
Fascist ideology prized the visual arts, by “creating romanticized versions of 
realism and neoclassical motifs in architecture, their art emphasized nudes as revealing of 
race.190  Central to Nazi ideology was the worship of beauty, by creating ‘normative 
aesthetics,’ guidelines for what was ‘correct’ in the adherence to a cult of artistic beauty 
was translated to youth, the standard-bearers for future generations.  This beauty was 
based upon the 19th century concept of aestheticism in society and the cult of youth, a 
view of the ‘visual age’ to be dominated by a ‘visual culture.’  The fruition of this cult of 
youth was the emphasis on masculinity and physical superiority.  Men and youth were 
the predominate force in the political movement, ‘radical misogyny’ abhorred anything 
androgynous and emphasized masculinity in art.191  This 
cult of manliness and a more self conscious emphasis on masculine 
expression was a reaction to sedentary egalitarian tendencies of modern 
society.192  
Nazi propaganda was therefore obsessed with the physic of the male and female 
body to further racial stereotypes, just as German architecture reflected the notion that 
“we are the heirs of cultural greatness.”193  
The European continent over the past century had experienced tumultuous 
growing pains; from early revolutions to the consolidation of Nation-States and the 
emergence of diverse ideologies.  These contributing factors coalesced near the end of the                                                  
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century with rising Imperialism and the Second Industrial Revolution to set the stage for 
the militaristic confrontation of ‘machine warfare’ in what would prove to be the 
bloodiest period of world history, known as the ‘century of war.’   
The nationalist ideology had thus conquered Central and Eastern Europe 
and, from the early twentieth century onward, embarked on its triumphant 
march toward self-realization.194 
The most powerful political driving force in nineteenth-and twentieth-
century Central and Eastern Europe was a highly emotional nationalism 
that mobilized tens of millions to act on its “eternal” principle.195 
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IV. THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 
A. POLITICAL CHANGE IN IMPERIAL GERMANY: WILHELM II  
The final decades of the nineteenth century, along with the first decade of the 
twentieth century, witnessed the change of nationalism in Germany from a progressive 
ideology--associated with liberty and democracy--to a conservative brand of patriotism 
with an elitist doctrine, which regarded other nationalities with contempt and inferiority.  
With the ascension to the throne of Wilhelm II in 1888 and the subsequent removal of 
Bismarck in 1890, the astute statecraft--which had guided Germany’s foreign policy 
under the tutelage of Bismarck--was swept aside in favor of a more aggressive, 
confrontational approach.  Wilhelm II’s approach to social issues garnered him increased 
popularity and political prestige among the masses.  However, it was his diplomatic 
incompetency and meddling that further isolated Germany and destroyed the careful 
balance of power so skillfully crafted under Bismarck; e.g. failure to diplomatically 
isolate France, lapsing of the Reinsurance Treaty with Russia, and most significantly, 
embarking on colonial expansion to attain ‘a place in the sun,’ highlighted by a naval 
arms race with Great Britain (Tirpitz Plan). The emperor’s blatant militarism fueled a 
right-wing shift in political and military thinking, contributing significantly to the 
previous centuries emerging idealism and grandiose aspirations of conquest.  The military 
was not unaffected by these emerging trends, and they continued to fester after the turn of 
the century. 
The intellectual climate of 1914, however, differed significantly from that 
of 1880.  Subtle forces had drastically altered the value structure of the 
German nation.  As a result, military popularity became a threat rather 
than an aid to professionalism.  A limited and conservative ideology had 
given way to one which was nationalistic and aggressive.  Materialism, 
bellicosity, the glorification of violence and war, worship of naked Macht 
superseded the more reasonable, idealistic, and humane elements in the 
German spirit.  Mommsen, Droysen, Sybel, Treitschke, Nietzsche 







became ends in themselves and the man of power consequently was 
viewed not as the servant of the state but rather as the embodiment of the 
State.196 
The dawn of a new century did nothing to dampen the growing nationalistic 
expectations and ambitions of European governments and the populations they ruled. 
Vast resources had been allocated to a military build up on the continent with two age-old 
enemies--Germany and France--overseeing an armaments race for nearly forty years, 
which resulted in the largest standing armies in history.  With these dedicated resources 
and the fevered pitch of rampant nationalism, governments and their military’s 
succumbed to the growing call to flex their respective military muscle.  However, not all 
were swept up in the tide of nationalism and war; the voice of caution was best 
represented by French revolutionary Jean Jaures, who ominously predicted; 
From a European war a revolution may spring up and the ruling classes would do 
well to think of this.  But is may also result, over a long period, in crises of 
counter-revolution, of furious reaction, of exasperated nationalism, of stifling 
dictatorships, of monstrous militarism, a long chain of retrograde violence.197 
The more militant had a far different view of the prospects/goals and benefits of 
war 
[In Germany] nearly all the political parties, the business community, a 
high proportion of the university professoriate, the bulk of the middle 
class, and significant portions of the working class were desirous of the 
most ambitious kind of territorial expansion and were sure that the war 
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Others celebrated and hoped for a war as a purge that could not end before 
the grand national cleansing was completed, the shackles of materialism 
and corporatism had fallen off, and a new society was forged in the pure 
spirit of nationalism.199 
 
B. REVOLUTION 1918-1920 
The previous three opportunities for significant constitutional reform in Prussian 
history had been predicated upon; defeat and then reform (1808-1819), the military’s 
oppression and abuse in response to political unrest (1848), and the constitutional conflict 
and reform of Bismarck’s era (1860-66).  Whereas, the military had been saved by 
potential reforms in the former and middle class fears and foreign victories in the latter, 
the period of 1918-1920 is unique; for the military was saved not by victory, but defeat 
and the ensuing chaos and middle class fears associated with the rise of bolshevism. 
Defeat is sometimes enough to spark fundament reform within a military 
system; this had been the case in Prussia after its loss to Napoleon in 1806.  
The First World War for all its horrific impact did not create a like effect 
in Germany.  The General Staff developed a set of explanations for the 
defeat that missed the most important issues.  Failed domestic polices; 
conflict between the army and the home front; and the lack of a strong 
centralized command.200 
The officer corps faced a unique challenge during the closing days of the Great 
War.  The imperial balance in civil-military relations had been shattered and the General 
Staff had, in effect been running the government.  This created two unique problems.  
First, how to avoid public accountability and responsibility for defeat 
(Kriegsschuldfrage). 
The high command was also responsible for the fact that public opinion in 
Germany was in no way prepared for this blow, because it had been fed 
for years with the hope of a ‘victor’s peace.201 
Second, if not more important, the desire to maintain its privileged position within 
the traditional elites.  The military led by General Erich von Ludendorff and Field 
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Marshal Paul von Hindenburg addressed the first issue by creating the myth of the ‘stab 
in the back,’ (DolchstoBlegende) Ludendorff and the German high command “virtually 
ordered the majority parties [Social Democrats, Catholic Centre Party and the Liberals] in 
the Reichstag to assume power before the cease fire.”202 Ludendorff consequently would 
greatly influence Hitler with his military point of view and provided a scapegoat all in 
one.  Ludendorff reinterpreted Clausewitz’s view of the interaction of war and politics.  
He believed that 
war and politics were the same; war must end either in victory or in 
annihilation, not peaceful negotiation that permitted the enemy time to 
recover his strength.203 [Ludendorff also] saddled a convenient scapegoat 
with the responsibility for defeat, surrender, and the legend of the ‘stab in 
the back,’ which was to poison public life in the Weimar 
republic…democracy and those who supported it [were the scapegoat]204 
the government (and particularly the Jews) had failed the fighting men, 
first by not unifying German society behind the war effort, and then by 
concluding a treasonous truce when the army was still capable of fighting.  
The myth fulfilled two functions.  First, it kept the General Staffs hands 
clean from being a scapegoat and also allowed the General Staff to avoid 
facing up to the consequences of its action.  The General Staff was simply 
not prepared to question its own strategic assumptions.205 
On November 9, 1918, the army’s collapse and subsequent repercussions caused 
the end of the Hohenzollern dynasty, ending 280 years of service by the military.  The 
Reich was transformed into a republic.  This event threw the military leadership into a 
crisis, as not only did they have to deal with the repercussions of defeat, but their special 
relationship to the monarchy and within state. 
the abdication of the emperor was ‘not a mere change of the form of 
government.  It was--at least for the Prussian army--the collapse of the 
world.  The army had been “royal”, i.e., lined indissolubly with the person 
of the king…this army was inconceivable without the king.206 
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“It was the officers special position within the state--their standing as 
political elite--that determined not only their self-conception, but their 
attitude to the state and to society, even after the monarchy’s collapse.207 
Thus the officer corps in November 1918 was suddenly deprived of the 
spiritual and ideological centre on which it whole existence rested.208 
War and revolution resulted in a profound questioning of the system of 
political rule as well as the social system in which the Prusso-German 
officer corps came into being and evolved.  At the same time, the inner 
unity of the officer corps was disintegrating as warfare [had] became 
mechanized and industrialized.209 
The army was quickly able to weather the storm due to several factors, among 
them, the overwhelming fear of communism by the middle class.   
[The] majority of German people in the years 1918-20, including the 
leaders of the largest socialist parties, were more afraid of communism 
than they were of an unreformed and unregenerate military 
establishment...a few of the army’s leaders had the wisdom to realize this 
and to exploit it for all that it was worth.210    
In October of 1918, true military reforms, the type feared by the army in 1848, 
1860, and 1883, finally seemed to be placed upon the army.  However, social revolution 
starting with the Kiel mutiny quickly spread throughout Germany, and socialist councils 
were quickly set up in major cities.   
At the beginning of November, the sailors of Kiel and Wilhelmshaven had 
mutinied, hoisted the red flag and formed sailors councils.  The authority 
of the naval officers had gone.  From the ports, the torch of revolution was 
carried to the western and southern Germany; everywhere workers and 
soldier’s councils were formed.211 
The result of these events was that on November 9th, Prince Max abdicated power 
and the republic of Germany was created.  This tide of events concerned the army, as 
socialism was biased against the maintenance of a professional military tradition.   
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The officer corps believed-or wanted to believe-themselves to be the heirs 
to medieval chivalry.212 
However, the chaos that enveloped the country presented the military with the 
opportunity to secure its role within the new government and insure the government’s 
dependence upon the military for its role; thus, a mutual beneficial relationship, although 
unstable at first, was established.  The majority Socialist leaders wished quickly to restore 
order rather than pursue a ‘genuinely socialist policy,’  
Their principle objective… was to quickly restore internal order as quickly 
as possible, lest the extremist drive Germany into the arms of bolshevism.  
The fact that this was so, offered the army an opportunity to assume a 
commanding position in the counsels of the new regime at the very outset 
of its existence; and one man at supreme headquarters had the intelligence 
to realize this [Groener].213 
The inauguration of the Weimar Republic saw the role of the military 
change from complete dominance of the sate to essential support for the 
state.214 
The emergence of General William Groener to replace Ludendorff as first 
quartermaster-general was crucial to the survival of the army in its historical role, despite 
the potential for the monarch’s abdication; Groener had two key beliefs;  
he believed the unity of Reich must be maintained, [and that] the officer 
corps must be preserved as the protector of that unity, the guardian of 
national stability and development, the source of moral-spiritual strength 
for future generations.215   
[Groener] sought the alliance with the new government.  ‘he though he 
knew that a reconstruction of Germany was impossible without the help of 
the officer corps, and when on 9 November he let the monarch go by 
default, it was precisely because he feared that it would other wise drag 
the officer corps with it.216 
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Additionally, upon receipt of the allied peace terms, Groener realized the 
unacceptability of their demands, and wished to save the army the embarrassment and 
responsibility of accepting them; thus, the need for a civilian government to accept 
responsibility (continuation/origin of ‘stab in the back’ theory).  Groener expressed these 
views and his parallel goal of insuring a place within the new government for the army 
when he wrote; 
[the need] with keeping our weapons clean and the general staff 
unburdened for the future, [the army] needed a civilian government, which 
would assume the responsibility for accepting them. [Peace terms].217 
We hoped to transfer through our activity, part of the power in the new 
state to the army and the officer corps: if we succeed in this, the best and 
the strongest element of the old Prussian was saved for the new Germany, 
in spite of revolution218 
A fateful phone call between Groener and Friedrick Ebert (leader of the Majority 
Socialist party & new Chancellor of the Reich) sealed the deal of mutual support for each 
other’s organizations and the role the army would perform based on the army’s 
perception of the government’s responsibilities.  Groener promised the high command 
would continue its functions to insure order while troops returned from the front, in 
exchange, for the government’s pledge in securing the army’s supplies and maintaining 
army discipline.219  
It was only natural that the high command, to secure its own authority, co-
operated ever more closely with the moderate section of the government 
and it leader, Ebert.220 
The army’s guarantees were conditional; Groener highlighted conditions that the 
government must meet in exchange for the support of the army,  
he stressed the fact that the officer corps looked to the government to 
combat bolshevism and was putting itself at the government’s disposal 
primarily for that purpose.221 
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This deal, although one of expedience and necessity due to the ongoing revolution 
would doom the Weimar Republic. 
The continued revolution created a situation in which Groener realized the army 
could no longer contain radical elements of the left and the spartacists.  This was 
highlighted by the Independents charges that Ebert was conspiring with the military and 
their refusal to admit returning troops to enter Berlin.  Ebert succumbed to army threats 
of withdrawing support for his government, and the situation was resolved upon entering 
the city; the soldiers deserted and returned to their families.  This social turmoil he 
deduced could not be combated by enlisted members of the regular army as it had since 
been transformed into a ‘people’s army,’ and that their loyalty was in question. These 
fears were magnified by the large number of soldiers returning from the eastern front who 
had been tainted by communist influences. 
In occupied Russia, many thousands of German soldiers had come into 
touch with bolshevism; since the outbreak of Russian revolution, 
Bolshevik propagandist tried with all their strength to bring about 
fraternization between the German and Russian armies.  There was ample 
evidence that their efforts had not been entirely in vain.”222 
Therefore, the need arose for ‘specially raised and trained volunteer troops.’  This 
event, coupled with the formation of a civil guard (Freiwillige Volkswehr), the National 
Congress of Soldiers and the Workers Council’s resolutions for the dismissal of 
Hindenburg and the passage of the ‘Hamburg points’ (which greatly restricted army 
powers; i.e., officer corps), prompted Groener and Kurt von Schleicher to arrive in Berlin 
and then again threatened to withdraw support for Ebert’s government unless the 
Hamburg points were “rejected out of hand.”223 
the high command believed the moderate social democrats had let 
themselves be intimidated [by the left].224 
Ebert’s actions infuriated the Independent socialists (USPD) who tried to take 
Ebert prisoner.  The army deployed to the Marstall in Berlin (site of 1848 deployment to 
suppress riots), and when surrounded by crowds, Prussian guards dropped their weapons 
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and ran.  This very humiliating event caused the Independents and the spartacists to stop 
cooperation with the Ebert government and the elements of the supreme command 
advocated disolvement.  Groener stood firm and initiated the utilization of a previously 
discussed plan to mobilize volunteers to replace war-weary troops in order to fight the 
revolution.  He stated: 
The maintenance of the authority of the government must remain the 
objective of the army. Since they had failed to maintain it by means of the 
war-weary troops brought back from France, they must find new troops; 
and the logical solution was to revert to a plan discussed in the past, to 
concentrate on raising volunteers, or Freikorps.225  
The Freikorps represented the utilization and semi-official recognition of quasi-
paramilitary organizations working on behalf of the army to preserve the nation.  These 
implications would reemerge again in the violent 1930’s under the direction of the SA 
(Sturmabteilung). 
In January of 1919, both communists and socialists demonstrated and rioted in 
Berlin; the army was ineffective and the Freikorps was several days away from readiness.  
This moment is crucial, as the leaders of the Independents and the Spartacists were again 
indecisive as to how best save the revolution; no course of action could be agreed upon to 
overthrow the Ebert government.  The government/army had for the second time (1848), 
been saved by the indecisiveness of the leadership of the revolution, and after several 
days, the crowd’s motivation had died out and momentum swung towards Ebert.226 
While the momentum for the revolution had died out and its leaders were trying to 
negotiate with Ebert, the army had had enough.  The Freikorps were now ready, and the 
army realized the opportunity that presented itself; the destruction of bolshevism and its 
implications to the ‘officer corps’ was now at hand and could not be ignored, as in 1848.  
January 1919 saw the beginning of bloody suppression by the Freikorps of insurrections.  
Over the next several months, the systematic re-conquest of German cities by the 
Freikorps crushed the bolshevist movement.  The unique aspect of this was that the ‘old 
officer corps’ utilized a volunteer militia, who they had long since opposed as a threat to 
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their dynastic right, to eliminate a far greater threat to their legacy.  The army’s display of 
force to crush the opposition and restore order resulted in no further attempts by the 
National Assembly to push the Hamburg points. The delegate’s primary concern was 
insuring the strength of army for restoration of law and order; thus, insuring their place 
within the government.  These events greatly compromised the new governments position 
on future army reforms and,  
they were entirely willing to leave the internal administration and 
command of the army in the hands of the old officer corps.227  
The March 6, 1919, law creating the Provisional Reichswehr (although it called 
for an ‘army built on democratic basis’) had insured the maintenance of the status quo by 
the manner in which future officers were allowed to be chosen.  This insured the social 
composition of the officer class and preservation of the ‘imperial officer corps.’ 
The Reichswehr grew out of these free corps, and the old officer corps, 
above all the general staff, was the principal factor in its formation.  It is 
impossible to answer the question whether there was an alternative way of 
forming an efficient republican army; but there can be no doubt that there 
were democratic officers who might have been willing to serve in such an 
army.228 
One of the causes of the increased functional and social narrowness of the 
officer corps…was [the] attempt to restore the homogeneity, which had 
been broken by the war and which was an important precondition of the 
claim to a political elite status.  [Thus] the post war army Reichswehr was 
more strongly dominated by a leadership drawn from the nobility and the 
bourgeoisie than had been the case before or during the war.229 
 
1. Analysis 
Throughout the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries the chiefs of staff 
and commanders in chief of the Prusso-German army thought of war, once 
it had broken out, as an essentially autonomous activity, and did 
everything in their power to protect the army, its strategy and its 
operations, from political interference.230 
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In past crisis, the army’s prestigious role in the state had been saved by foreign 
victory, Bismarck’s political maneuvering, and middle class fears of chaos and 
instability.  On this occasion, the fear of communism and chaos by the middle class, 
combined with the moderate socialist political maneuvering, had provided the army with 
the means and opportunity in which to crush this emerging threat to their ‘old imperial 
order,’ and the use of non-professional soldiers (Freikorps) to insure their survival and 
the survival of their institution.  The army was able to identify the weakness of the 
fledgling republic, and on several episodes, threaten to withhold support unless the 
government acquiesced to the military’s demands.  The army leadership realized that, 
so deep...was the fear of communism and so skillful its exploitation by the 
military chiefs, that by the middle of the 1920s, the army was well on its 
way to becoming once more the state within the state that it had always 
been in the past.”231 
That the Weimar government existed as long as it did is due to army 
support.  That support, however, was not something which could be 
commanded by the government; it was something which was granted by 
the army.232 
Ironically, the army’s ability to play upon the instability and subsequent fears of 
the middle class created just the crises needed by the army to maintain its position.  Thus, 
the same middle class that for over a century was despised by the army, who repeatedly 
attempted to prevent the bourgeoisie from tainting the ranks of their aristocratic officer 
corps, provided the very reason for their continued viability to the German state after the 
collapse of the monarch.  The relationship of the army to the middle class thus became a 
mutual dependant relationship in which each group needed the other as justification for 
its existence in the face of emerging bolshevism.  The army’s attitude towards the series 
of events from 1918-20 can best be summed up by a quote from General Von Luttwitz, 
who stated in august 1919: 
Today, as yesterday, the army remains the basis of authority in the 
State.233 
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The army had once again managed to avoid significant reform, neither 
war, defeat, revolution or the post-war era evoked any essential 
modification in the basic political goals and ideals of the military elite.  In 
fact, those goals emerged more clearly cut and unequivocal.234  
Unfortunately, by advocating political demands and by allying itself with right 
wing elements of former soldiers, the General Staff set in motion a dangerous precedent 
that would politicize the younger officer corps over the next ten years. 
from the generals, the tendency to put forward political demands spread to 
the lower echelons.235 
The German officer corps at large was not ready to share military control, 
which is perhaps the strongest indication of the political mood in the 
officer corps at the time.236 
This ten-year period saw former soldiers turning increasingly towards Fascism 
and National Socialism where they found the call to action that desperately appealed to 
them.  The integration and cohesion of extremist ideas by these groups saw the rise of the 
SA and other rightwing Para-military groups that were far more organized than the 
Freikorps and less susceptible to military control.  
Those who supported nationalist revolution [Freikorps] failed to emerge 
as a serious force because of their own fragmentation and the relatively 
swift consolidation of republic.  Many were later to be found in the SA 
[Sturmabteilung] and the SS [Schutzstaffel].237   
Leaders of Nationalistic forces began to emerge as a powerful political and social 
factor in post war Germany. 
The ideas of the late 18th and 19th century were radically reinterpreted following 
the conclusion of World War I.  Payne observed that, from 
1914-1933 Germany experienced a sequence of traumas unparalleled in 
the history of any European country during that generation.238  
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These events, combined with the post-war chaos, economic crisis, and a sense of 
defeat created a situation in which people, searching for an identity and something to 
place their faith in, turned towards fascism to fill the void.  The cry for a strong 
government led to fascism.”239  Fascism was the most revolutionary form of nationalism 
in Europe.  It was characterized by its culture of philosophical idealism, will power, 
vitalism, and mysticism along with the moralistic concept of therapeutic violence that 
appealed to veterans.  This concept strongly identified with military values, outward 
aggressiveness, and empire.240  
 Fascism presented itself as a third alternative to capitalism or socialism, 
which promised to protect the position of middle classes through the 
establishment of an all-powerful corporatist state.241 
These ideas offered an alternative to communism and democracy that was more 
German in nature.  Fascism was the only genuine form of radicalism emerging from 
World War I.242 
The World War I years, and the ensuing misery, poverty, and humiliation, 
created a social and political environment in which these ideas could be 
translated into political reality.243 
 
C. POST WORLD WAR I: NATIONALISM INTO MILITARISM 
Out of the chaos of World War I, Germany emerged a shell of its former self; 
internationally, the European balance of power was destroyed, while domestically, the 
goals and ambitions of German people for the past century were shattered. 
The continuity of government, culture, and institutions in much of Europe 
were shattered by the impact of World War I.244  
The political fragmentation of the continent was matched by its economic 
fragmentation.245  
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Germany was forced to deal with the added burden of guilt and war repartitions 
imposed by the vengeful allies and dictated to the Germany’s newly established civilian 
government.   
The impact on culture and social psychology was equally profound; the 
trend towards optimism and faith in progress characteristic of the 
preceding century and a half was increasingly questions and often 
rejected.246   
Payne believes that, “Under the strain of war, German society appeared slowly to 
dissolve into angry factions.”247  The release of this emotion can best be articulated in a 
quote from Adolph Hitler, who reflected upon hearing of the German capitulation wrote, 
I had not cried since the day I stood beside my mother’s grave, but now I 
could not help it.  During those nights my hatred increased, hatred for the 
originators of this dastardly crime.248 
Thus, pre-war nationalism combined with post-war chaos formed the foundation 
for the radical ideas of fascism.  The radical elements of the nationalist movement in post 
war Europe took the foundations of nationalism and corrupted the ideas, moving the 
theory in a dangerous direction; full of intolerance, racial hatred, and justification of 
violence for violence sake.  The corruption of nationalistic ideas and the application of 
these policies is the basis for fascist evolution in the political arena.   
The experiences of World War I…were required for the crystallization of 
these intellectual currents into fascism.249 
The feelings of nationalism before World War I reemerged with vitality and were 
radicalized by the perversion of the emotion of ‘August days’ as an outlet for the millions 
of young combat tested and aggressive veterans who joined the Freikorps, in search of 
action.   
There is sense only in danger, marching into uncertainty is sense enough 
for us, because it answers the demands of our blood.250 
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Added to this emotion were the “so called Generation of 1902, who joined up to 
make up for the action not seen during the war.”251  
Engagement was the point, as political stakes were often irrelevant.  War 
had fashioned compelling images of national solidarity that would largely 
determine the politics of the postwar era.252  
This vein of emotion, expression by the radicalized veterans and the youthfully 
energetic, was tapped into by fascist looking for an audience to ignite behind their 
political banner of change.  The pre-war patriotism of nationalism did not die with the 
defeat of World War I but was reborn and redirected in ‘German days’ or ‘Stahlhelm 
Days,’ attracting thousands of patriots to marches and giving them a:  
politically confident and forward looking quality to the nationalist 
sociability.  These large public gatherings provided compelling visual 
affirmation of the cherished Volksgemeinschaft.253 
The disillusionment of World War I cast doubt on rationality as fundamental to 
civilization. Because of this disillusionment, the belief that a dramatic new direction for 
western civilization was required if it were to survive, emerged.     
Here was a widespread recognition that prewar political life had been too 
socially exclusive, too compliant to the interests of economic elites, and 
too ignorant of the contributions of ordinary citizens.  The great 
opportunity of the war was to recast German politics in a more socially 
inclusive and self-reliant mold.254 
Many people who had thought of the war as a means of “purification” 
changed their minds.  They viewed war as neither a purgatory nor a 
vehicle of renewal.  But they recognized that it had destroyed the old, 
stable framework of society and created an opportunity to pursue the 
social and national aspirations that had been fermenting for decades.255 
The additional feeling of humiliation and double-cross by the treaty of Versailles 
left the new German state weakened by the war, susceptible to popular socialist 
                                                 
250 Peter Fritzsche, Germans into Nazis, 125 
251 Peter Fritzsche, Germans into Nazis, 125 
252 Peter Fritzsche, Germans into Nazis, 81 
253 Peter Fritzsche, Germans into Nazis, 135 
254 Peter Fritzsche, Germans into Nazis, 51 
255 Ivan T. Berend, Decades of Crisis: Central and Eastern Europe before World War II, 115 
60 
movements that threatened the fragile parliamentary government.  The intense patriotism 
that was aroused by World War I led to wide support for right wing nationalistic 
movements that preached confrontation and victory over the political disorder of the 
period.   
The goal of disintegration of modern society and the unifying experience 
of war viewed in aesthetic terms fueled the message that a new nation 
must arise like a phoenix from the ashes; this was the quintessential 
experience that inspired the generation of 1914.256  
The middle class and elite were especially susceptible to the rhetoric of National 
Socialism out of a spreading fear of communism throughout Europe due to the collapse 
of the Russian government.    
As previously mentioned, the ideas and concepts of fascism were first articulated 
in France during the revolutionary period and then debated by various sources over the 
next hundred years.  It took the chaos of World War I and the post war dissonance to 
begin to merge these ideas in a period of political discontent and turmoil, the likes that 
Europe had never seen.  Out of this chaos, fascism began to be seen as a viable political 
movement by those who believed and advocated its principles.  In the beginning, fascism 
drew on a combination of left and right wing ideas that relied heavily on the 
characteristics of nationalism, (i.e. productivism, anti-Socialism, elitism) and the need for 
a strong leader. The increasing fear and insecurity of the different classes (industrialist 
and middle class) to socialism and communism compounded by the overall lack of faith 
in traditional pre-war and emerging post-war political systems, created a climate for this 
‘third way.’  The fascist parties held out the promise of this needed security in an 
unprecedented form.257The modification of nationalism to a xenophobic ideology was the 
beginning of the frightening path, which ultimately led Germany again to war. 
 
D. MILITARISM INTO FASCISM INTO BROADER MASS APPEAL 
Thus, the characteristics of fascism began to solidify to any and every audience 
that would listen with the primary focus on unemployed veterans.  
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These listeners were desperate, hunted men, tormented by demons, hungry 
for miracles and thrills, caring nothing for contradictions in political 
manifestos, logical errors, or factual discrepancies.  The ‘Fuhrer’ 
demanded their faith and devotion and offered in return certainty and 
security in a new community that would protect and care for them: that 
was what their followers were looking for, and that was what they 
found.258  
Throughout the next fourteen years, interest groups would lurch from 
populist, even egalitarian postures to darker, more aggressively 
antisocialist positions.  One thing was clear: over the course of war and 
revolution, Germans had developed a regular mania for speaking out, 
[Redewut] as one beleaguered chairman put it.259 
These youthful veterans, who were disillusioned with the hangover of emotions 
from ‘August days,’ were in search of an ideal or cause to believe in and justify their 
sacrifice for their county.  Fascism, with its glorification of war and violence, willingness 
to struggle against all odds, dignity of mad heroism, emphasis on the greatness of dying 
for the cause in war, justified and validated their efforts on behalf of their country; and 
allowed them to continue the struggle against a new enemy or an old one.  
Fascism encouraged activism, the fight against the existing order of things 
(Mosse) to remake the human world, to forge a new future.  There was a desire to finish 
what ‘had been started’ and recapture the momentum from ‘august days.’ This growing 
movement was strongly felt by a generation tested by the hardships of war.  They refused 
to settle for the conditions dictated to them by the allies, and imposition of a democratic 
form of government (Weimar Republic) forced upon them by “Anglo-American and 
French liberalism.”260      
The National Socialist appealed to the masses [for two reasons]; demand 
for political involvement, already awakened for many decades and since 
1918/19 ever more wide spread; and…to the broad resentment felt against 
the ‘un-German’ Weimar system, ‘un-German’ because allegedly imposed 
from above.261 
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Democracy was despised, viewed as weak and idle representing compromise 
when action was required.  Increasingly radical right-wing elements called for the 
immediate and violent change to the existing government  
History is made in the street; the street is the political characteristic of this age.262  
Germans refused to return to the former political structure; due to a widespread 
lack of confidence in the historical political systems organic to Europe.  This evolving 
aggressive attitude infiltrated many areas of German society, including the military, 
where enlisted and junior officers started voicing a more activist stance towards the 
Weimar government and viewed perceived inaction on the part of the senior leadership as 
cooperation and/or compromise with the left leaning Reichstag.  Not only was there 
animosity towards democracy among the general population and the junior leadership of 
the military, but the attitude of the General Staff towards the parliamentary system can 
best be summed up by General Hans von Seeckt, who as the post-war Commander in 
Chief of the Reichswehr was exceedingly critical of the Weimar Constitution and the 
parties which created and supported it.263 
Seeckt also had a strong antipathy to parliament and the parliamentary 
system.  He described parliament as ‘the cancer of our time’.264 
These ideas and opinions, although more predominant in the lower and middle 
classes, had now began to permeate across class boundaries.   
The movement’s vague, catch-all ideology, emphasizing integrations and 
community by negation, met its need to attract different groups with 
varying interests and goals.265 
While not all Nazi beliefs were viewed as universal truths by all segments of 
society, each section was able to extract the particular aspects that were beneficial to 
them and either disregard or ignore the rest.   
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Many traditional elites, those who as a whole had no reason to be attracted 
by the Nazis immediate appeal, eventually gave their support to the party 
because it was able to serve a function that they (given their preferences) 
would have assigned others.  For churchmen, civil servants, military 
officers, the party’s appeal was primary tactical.  Rearmament, anti-
communism, law and order, a supposed reaffirmation of traditional 
values…made the Nazis palatable, despite misgivings.266 
This growing trend towards contempt for the ‘November criminals’ and their 
perceived impotence when action was required, combined with the belief in a ‘superior 
German culture,’ was fundamental in the furtherance of National Socialism.   
Other ingredients [of fascism] involved the application of military 
metaphors to political life, the psychological mobilization of the masses 
for civil war, and glorification of action for its own sake.  It was the 
primacy of action over reason that constitute the basically irrational 
character of National Socialist and Fascist propaganda and ensured it 
effectiveness in the fight against the scarcely credible programs of the 
Conservative, Liberal, and Socialist democratic parties.  The myths of the 
nation and of race played a prominent part in the pronouncements of the 
Fascist and National Socialist parties. Behind the accusation that 
democracies had betrayed the nation lay an inflated, indeed absolute 
adulation of the ‘nation,’ with the party and its leader as its sole 
champions and representatives.  In most cases the burning issue was the 
revision of the outcome of the First World War, often entailing even more 
extensive territorial demands.267 
Fascism unlike Nationalism, Imperialism, Socialism and Bolshivism, was the only 
significant new idea to emerge from the chaos of World War I and interwar period. 
Therein lay the genius of fascism; it appealed to different segments of society and 
appeared to address their grievances or issues.  Although without a defined plan and with 
just the ‘call for action,’ fascism inspired hope among its adherents to a greater force to 
effect change and correct political and/or social class problems of integration, restoring 
Germany once again to its rightful ‘place in the sun.’  
Modern mass society allowed the Nazis to attract a following from across 
the social spectrum.  The party offered an antidote to anomie, atomization 
and deracination, holding out a lamp to the millions cut lose from primary 
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ties of family and intermediary associations to drift unmoored on the seas 
of a hypertrophied Gesellschaft.268 
At its roots, National Socialist ideology contained only one tangible idea: 
the idea of struggle.269 
 
E. POST-WAR APPEAL OF FASCISM 
The origins of integral national fascism and National Socialism originate from a 
wide variety of conditions prevalent throughout Europe during the 18th to 20th century.  
They drew on emerging ideas from a diverse collection of writers, intellects, 
philosophers, and intelligentsia in reaction to ongoing social, political and economic 
issues.  Nationalism, racism, and irrationalism emerged as characteristics of fascism.  
These traits were incorporated into a strong reinterpretation of culture, Social Darwinism 
and youth; in combination with mysticism, race and religion to form a fascist ideology 
unique to Nazi Germany.  This ideology emphasized a love of violence and war; rejecting 
the liberal democratic institutions which were viewed as weak, ineffective, and passive.  
Social renewal was based on the national community, by popularizing myths of national, 
cultural, or ethnic renewal.  Fascism strongly believed that the state symbolized the 
people and embodied the national will; this was integral to fascist ideology.  
No single factor was of crucial importance by itself, but only insofar as it 
converged, or was unable to converge with other influences.270 
What matters is not so much what we believe; only that we believe.271 
The contributing factors that made National Socialism so destructive were the 
myths of national greatness and a belief in a destiny of achieving national military power.  
These ideas, combined with influences from the romantic era and fused with pseudo-
scientific theories of race, genetics, and eugenics to breed a new master race.272  
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Fascism tended to be hostile towards other liberal and socialist ideologies due to 
its desire to create a renewed, or unified, national or ethnic community.  It was strongly 
opposed to doctrines of conservatism, liberalism, individualism, materialism, and 
communism.  Fascism was against all scientific, economic, religious, academic, cultural 
and leisure activities that did not see their vision of national life or the avocation for the 
expansion of territory.  
Consistent with the Romantic conception of self and nation, fascism called 
for the construction of a state--with unified political and economic 
institutions, and definite geographical borders--upon the nation, composed 
of persons bound together by language, history and culture.273 
The middle class crisis of post-war Germany was capitalized on by fascism.  The 
Middle class believed it could forge a new system, through activism and participation that 
would correct a “previously denied status among the social elite.”274 This participation 
would insure a more important role domestically, thereby resulting in the eventually 
restoration of Germany’s rightful international role, destroyed by the outcome of the First 
World War I. 
The traumatic experience after the first World War, its degradation into a 
second-class power at precisely that historical moment when it had every 
prospect of becoming a first-class world power. [was a bitter burden for 
the middle class to bear]275 
  Fascism appealed to the fears and desires of the middle class, and promised 
fulfillment of their goals and protection from their fears of socialism and communism.  
Whereas,  
liberal democracy had lost from the start, not because it was liberal, but 
because it was dull and an obstacle to those thrilling experiences for which 
the sprit of the time yearned…right and left both agreed, what mattered to 
both extreme movements was the shaping of the future.276    
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F. YOUTH MOVEMENT  
He alone, who owns the youth, gains the Future!277 
The early 19th century saw the development of gymnastic and youth associations, 
these athletic associations propagated a distinctly militant brand of 
nationalistic ideology in many countries in the early 1800s, especially 
Germany.278  
These organizations shared a common thread, 
three key ideas; a mixture of physical culture, character training, and 
patriotic propaganda, promoting the national ideal.279  
[they emphasized] a longing for new forms of community, aroused even 
before the war by the youth movement and confirmed and reinforced by 
the legendary comradeship of the front.280 
These clubs (Turnvereine) and societies tended to be inspired by patriotic 
motives. These organizations, coupled with the late 19th century, “emphasis on fresh air, 
and the outdoor life, encouraged the reaffirmation of the physical, a new emphasis on 
restoring contact with nature.”281 These years are attributed to the genesis of 20th century 
youth culture, youth movements, nature societies, and the rapid expansion of organized 
sports.”282 Fascist were best able to capitalize on these trends by incorporating 
nationalism into their youth movements, increasing their attractiveness over competing 
youth activities and furthering their ‘bottom up’ social integration.283   
Fascist exaltation of youth was unique, not only did it make a special 
appeal to them but exalted youth over all other generations, without 
exception, and to a  greater degree than any other force based itself on 
generational conflict.284 
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This exaltation partially stemmed from the organic concept of the nation, and of 
youth as its new life force, and from the predominance of youth in struggle through 
militarization.  Fascism catered ideas to the youth who were not as prudent or 
materialistic as older more established generations.  
The fascist cult of daring, action and the will to a new ideal was inherently 
attuned to youth who could respond in ways that the older generation was 
unable or unwilling too.285  
By the 1920s all major political parties had youth groups.  This emphasis on 
youth was for two reasons; the high birthrate prior to World War I led to an 
overabundance of men between the ages of 15-25 and the horrific mortality rate suffered 
during the war by males now 26 to 50 created a pronounced generation gap. 286 
By encouraging enrollment in these youth organizations, National Socialist were 
able to accelerate their indoctrination of the young through the emphasis of creating a 
new society; their goal of creating a new type of culture in which values, politics, art, 
social norms and economic activity were all part of a single organic national community 
(volksgemeinschaft) founded around concept of racial purity.   
[In] European fascist countries, art architecture, and literature became 
vehicles of propaganda which served to unify citizens with one another 
and with their nation-state.287 
This infatuation with youth was designed to produce new generations of racially 
pure Germans, politically indoctrinated and physically fit to provide the fatherland with 
the unquestioning leadership and blind obedience required of its solders for the future.  
The goal of the Nazi youth program was: 
To steel the bodies of our youth, to educate them in discipline, and 
devotion to the common great ideal to train them in the organizational and 
instructional service of the movement.288 
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The education and indoctrination of youth was integral to the re-ascending of 
Germany to power, out of the ashes of post-war chaos and defeat.  The Nazis managed to 
attract and eventually mobilize over 80 percent of youth into Hitler youth programs 
before 1939.289 
The pre-military preparation of Germany’s youth combined organizational 
principles such as group loyalty and absolute obedience to superiors-- 
individual qualifications which put physical stamina far above intellectual 
ability--and certain ideological tenants, the most important of which were 
racism, anti-Bolshevism, expansionism, and a quasi-religious faith in the 
Fuhrer, who constituted both the supreme authority, the embodiment of 
the Volk, and the arbiter of Germany’s destiny.290 
 
G. GENERATION GAP WITHIN OFFICER CORPS 
The officer corps that had gone into action in 1914 with common 
perceptions and traditions had by 1915-1916 been supplanted by a new 
breed of officer from lower social strata with a much different 
outlook…lacking the intense traditional bond to the crown…[and] were 
open to new political ideologies…[with] a tendency toward a more 
outspoken ideology of nationalism, ambition, and military daring291 
Lesson’s drawn from the battlefields of Europe after World War I indicated that 
the future wars would be fought by a 
new generation of officers who required technical specialties in [the] 
growing complexity of military apparatus.292 
These technological advancements in the art of war would require an officer corps 
that was technically and tactically proficient in the age of industrial warfare.  The ‘total 
war’ concept that the General Staff envisioned would require trained officers as never 
before.  This changing warfare was the initial cleavage in what was to become an ever-
widening gap between the ‘old staff’ officers of the General Staff and a new generation 
of officers lead by ‘line’ officers of the First World War.  Thus at the end of the war, 
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older officers (division commanders and above) ‘were in no way prepared for their new 
task and had little understanding of political questions.   
Their [older officers] political ideas were those of the Hohenzollern 
empire, while the new republican world was alien to them.293 
The opportunity that Germany had, in the years 1918-1920, to rethink the 
role of force in domestic and international relations was never exploited 
and for the most part was not even recognized.294 
In the aftermath of the 1920 Kapp Putsch, General Hans von Seeckt assumed 
control of the Reichswehr.  It has been said that the only clear winner was Seeckt who 
was able to gain the leadership of the Reichswehr and guide in with his strong hand in the 
manner he saw fit.  
Seeckt was able, through force of will, to “halt developing schisms within the 
officer corps immediately after the war by forcing the Reichswehr into a state of 
solidarity by his rigorously one-sided policy,”295Seeckt successfully avoided efforts by 
democratic authority (Reichstag) to interfere in military matters, and through the use of 
symbology refocused the Reichswehr on what he believed was their traditional role in 
society. 
The army should become a state within the state, but it should be merged 
in the State through service, in fact it should itself become the purest 
image of the State.296 
The primary concern of German military planners in the interwar years 
was to limit war in order to make it, once again, a purposeful and 
instrumental use of force on the basis of elite control of strategy.297 
 However, Seeckt’s efforts were eventually co-opted by the Nazis who exploited 
his original intentions. 
                                                 
293 F. L. Carsten, The Reichswehr and Politics 1918-1933, 192 
294 Michael Geyer, Makers of Modern Strategy, German Strategy in the Age of Machine Warfare, 
1914-1945, 555 
295 Joachim C. Fest, The Face of The Third Reich, 236 
296 Samuel P Huntington, The Soldier And The State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military 
Relations, 111; Quoting  Seeckt, Thoughts of a Soldier, 5-6 
297 Michael Geyer, Makers of Modern Strategy, German Strategy in the Age of Machine Warfare, 
1914-1945, 554 
70 
Seeckt’s concept of military tradition, which served as an ideological 
bulwark against party politics, later made soldiers susceptible to the appeal 
of the Nazis, who were clever enough to recognize and use the power of 
symbols to the fullest.298 
After Seeckt’s departure, it became progressively more difficult to maintain the 
unity of the officer corps on the foundation of his ideas.  
From the outset, the army command had attempted to prevent the army 
from being influenced by party politics and political extremism.  This was 
easily achieved with regard to communist propaganda.  All its efforts at 
winning over Reichswehr soldiers were defeated by their patriotic and 
nationalist convictions, which were the antithesis of communist ideas.299 
It was entirely different with regard to the ides of National Socialism.  
They made little impression on the older officers, as many observers and 
witnesses of the time have testified.  The older officers had grown up in 
the world of German Empire and remained loyal to it, in spite of war and 
revolution, or perhaps because of them.  Their opinions were strictly 
conservative and ‘black, white, and red.300 
The use of internal repression was found to have its limits to the extent to 
which the ‘state within a state ‘ideology lost its unifying power.301 
The Ulm incident of 1929 and subsequent Reichswehr trial was the chasm 
between the political views of older staff vs. younger line officers within the officer 
corps.  The majority of younger officers commissioned after the war were nearly 
unanimous in their support while the older generation were united against them.302 
The accused officers were convinced that there was a gulf between the 
army command and the ‘front’ of the army that the bureaucratic leadership 
could not be trusted, and that it was therefore essential to act without it.  
The officer corps was no longer united.303 
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The lieutenant’s conspiracy revealed not only a youthful activism and the 
widely aired antagonism between the ‘desk bound generals in Berlin and 
officers of the line.304  
The trial demonstrated the growing cleavage between old and new, (staff and line) 
younger officers began to articulate a lack of confidence in the leadership of the 
Reichswehr, which they strongly believed was controlled by the despised and ineffective 
parliament.305 
A gulf began to open between the young officers and their seniors which 
was deeper than the differences usually separating the generations.306 
Letters written at the time of the trial by numerous officers refer to the growing 
influence of nationalistic and patriotic propaganda on younger members of the officer 
corps.  In effect, a ‘bottom up’ change of attitude was beginning to take hold of not only 
the working class masses who made up the enlisted ranks, but also an increasing percent 
of the junior leadership of the army.   
With the passage of time, the tensions between innovation and the cult of 
the past tended to divided the generations of officer.  These social and 
political cleavages in the officer corps intensified as the prewar generation 
departed or rose to senior positions, and less tradition-bound officers grew 
in number.307 
This social condition was the main factor in the ‘us vs. them’ mentality of junior 
officers and ‘enlisted vs. pre-war’ ‘old school’ officers educated and indoctrinated with 
conservative, monarchist, Prussian three class franchise system. 
the letters prove how strongly even young officers, who disapproved of 
the steps taken by the three lieutenants and who were not national 
socialist, were influenced by the slogans of the extreme right, by its 
propaganda against the ‘system’ of Weimar and the office generals.308  
The National Socialist revolutionary élan, their repudiation of the 
Versailles and the Weimar system, [and] exaggerated nationalism were 
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extremely attractive to young men who came from the same social groups 
as many young national socialist and had the same basic ideas.309 
The military leadership under William Groener and Kurt von Schleicher was very 
aware of the growing nationalistic views of the younger officers.  Groener visited the of 
the Potsdam Cavalry Regiment’s officer’s mess to try and sway the lieutenants in favor of 
restraint.310 
In a letter to the Chief of Army Command General Heye, his son Lt. Heye 
concisely described the feelings of many company grade officers: 
there could be no obedience without confidence; and confidence in the 
political leadership was missing.311 
Verifying the gulf developing within the officer corps and the lack of senior 
leadership’s ability to understand the younger generation was an attempt on their part to 
issue orders instructing officers to separate themselves from the politics of the day and 
concentrate upon their military duties.  While this attempt most certainly would have 
worked in the pre-war non political army, the increasingly post-war politicized, right 
leaning officer corps ignored these instructions.   
It was politically naïve to believe that ‘a simple briefing of the officers’ 
would counter the ever growing radicalism among Germanys youth, or 
that rational arguments would avail against emotion and enthusiasm.  
These orders showed how badly informed Groener and Schleicher were 
about the mood among the young officers and how helpless they were in 
coping with it.312 
An additional letter written by Lt. Heye further elaborates on the chasm between 
officer corps, whereas before the war, orders and directives were followed without 
question, the younger generation wanted to know what was being done and why.  The 
failure of the free flow of information down the chain of command only exacerbated the 
situation as younger officers felt the older officers failed to act or had no plan to right the 
wrongs of Weimar. 
                                                 
309 F. L. Carsten, The Reichswehr and Politics 1918-1933, 311 
310 F. L. Carsten, The Reichswehr and Politics 1918-1933, 313 
311 F. L. Carsten, The Reichswehr and Politics 1918-1933, 322 
312 F. L. Carsten, The Reichswehr and Politics 1918-1933, 322 
73 
young officers… are not pro-Nazi because of the Nazi program, but 
because they believe they discover here a force which fights the decline of 
the Reich, which does what they expect from the Reichswehr.313  
In general, however the lectures had little success with their efforts to 
abate the tension which existed between the ministry and the ‘front’ of the 
Reichswehr.  The majority of the officer’s, who received their information 
exclusively from the right wing press, simply did not understand the 
policy of the army command.314 
While not specifically national socialist, but rather national revolutionary, 
derived from the ideology of the free corps and other extreme nationalist 
formations.  It also reflected the ideas of Scharnhorst and the radical 
soldiers of the war of liberation against Napoleon, assuming that Germany 
in 1929 faced the same situation.315 
Younger officers ‘embittered about the bad chances of promotion in 
Reichswehr and about the many incapable staff officers of pre-war times 
who occupy the post of command.316  
To a growing number of younger officers and citizens alike, fascism seemed like 
the only viable solution to a weak and ineffective government and military.  National 
Socialism was not the product of these events but would have been impossible without 
them.317   
 
H. HITLER’S MILITARY APPEAL 
The German state had a long tradition of authoritarian government, and many 
Germans associated the liberalization of the government with the outbreak of war, 
and more importantly, the devastation of the post-war period.  Many sought a 
return to the old ways, believing that modern, liberal beliefs had sacrificed 
German honor and allowed the state to depreciate in the name of freedom.  Hitler 
offered not freedom, but rather security.318 
Hitler’s increasing popularity and his right wing militarism, appealed to some 
within the army’s senior leadership.  Individual members of the General Staff began to 
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view National Socialism as a vehicle that would facilitate the army in attaining its two 
primary goals; the reintegration of the army to the society and an authoritarian 
government with which to restore Germany’s military strength to pre-war status as a 
European hegemon.  Thus:  
The leaders of the Reichswehr came increasingly to recognize the gulf that 
was opening between their political aspirations and their ability to realize 
them.  [Further] developments in domestic politics in the late 20s made 
their inability to do so more apparent.319  
While many senior officers upheld traditional social, political, and military 
values, they were attracted to Hitler, not least because he made possible 
the rapid modernization of the army.320 
Several members of the ‘old guard’ recognized the opportunity to rally the masses 
behind the post-war goals of the military through the cooperation with National 
Socialism.  
Blomberg and Reichenau, along with a growing circle of officers-
especially young ones-considered the senior members of the Army 
Directorate to be hopelessly old fashioned, out of step with the times, and 
perhaps even dangerous to the political survival o the army as an 
institution.321 
Hitler’s election victory September 1930, celebrated by [Ludwig von] 
Beck in the officers mess, that at that time, he was certainly an exception 
among the senior officers.  It was different with many young officers who 
had been schoolboys during the world war and for whom the Empire was 
a mere shadow of the past.322 
Among the younger officers, National Socialism and their promise of rearmament 
offered yet another profound advantage over the perceived impotency of the Weimar 
government.  
Among the young officers, a considerable minority clearly opted for the 
activist NSDAP, not only for reasons of national temperament and 
because of the inactivity and weakness of the Republican authority, but  
 
                                                 
319 Klaus-Jurgen Müller, The Army, Politics and Society in Germany, 1933-45, 28 
320 Omer Bartov, HITLER’S ARMY: Soldiers, Nazis, and war in the Third Reich, 4 
321 Geoffrey P. Megargee, Inside Hitler’s High Command, 27 
322 F. L. Carsten, The Reichswehr and Politics 1918-1933, 311 
75 
also from professional resentment at seeing themselves condemned to a 
‘career in the second rank’ by the restriction to a hundred-thousand-man 
army.323 
When National Socialism, with its new, nationalistic slogans, appeared 
upon the scene, the younger elements of the Officer Corps were soon 
inflamed by the patriotic theories propounded by Hitler and his 
followers.324 
With the appointment of Hitler to Chancellor in January of 1933, the army began 
expanding the ranks of the Reichswehr officer corps, nearly doubling the total of 3,800 in 
October 1933 to 6,553 in 1934, with a goal of 13,000 by 1941.325   This coupled with the 
reintroduction of universal conscription in 1935 with a goal of 35 divisions served to 
dilute the number of ‘old guard’ officers and in effect minimized their ability to limit the 
influence of National Socialism within the ranks. 
The introduction of universal conscription swiftly expanded the army and 
further undermined the homogeneity of the old cadres. This coupled with 
the expansion of state and party agencies of repression; i.e., Gestapo and 
the SD [Sicherheitsdienst] all contributed to weaken the position of the 
military elite.  All the time that the basis for the realization of its (army’s) 
own foreign policy goals seemed to be much improved.326 
The influx of new officers also had political repercussions. As the number 
of officer’s increased, the army had to accept many who were already 
dedicated Nazis.  Nazism had been creeping into the officer corps for 
some time, but now took on a whole new dimension.327  
As the number of Nazi officers grew, the unity of the officer corps, which 
was vital to good discipline and efficiency, as well as to political stability, 
slipped away. The army became increasingly polarized between those few 
older officers who, like Fritsch and Beck, wanted to keep the part at arms 
length and a growing number of younger officers who wanted the army to 
become a thoroughly national socialist institution. Thus, the political 
element of the debate exacerbated the normal generational conflict that 
occurs in large organizations everywhere.328 
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Petty jealousies, ambition, and the use of influence to gain promotion 
became more and more the rule rather than the exception.329   
In response to the dwindling influence of pre-war traditions, the army’s senior 
leadership tried hard after 1935 to create a new sense of esprit de corps within the officer 
corps, applying a mixture of Nazi doctrines they found practical, in combination with 
pre-war army traditions.  These attempts proved unsuccessful.  
The officer corps was a long way from dissolution, but neither was it the 
spiritually unified structure it had been in the 20s.330 
Indeed, ever since the collapse of the Kaiserheer, the German officer corps 
had been searching for a new set of ideas that would form the crucial link 
between effective action and spiritual commitment, both endowing the 
deed with a higher meaning and deriving its essence from the experience 
of combat; now that they had been provided with such an ideology, they 
were not  likely to take it lightly.331 
More significant in the long run was the infiltration of Nazi-oriented 
younger officers into the lower ranks.  The very speed which the Nazis 
demanded in the expansion of the army made it difficult, as Beck and 
others saw it would, for the army to digest its new recruits and indoctrinate 
them in the code of the corps.  The newer officers were frequently 
graduates of Nazi youth organizations.  Although in the early years of the 
regime, the army tried to curb the influx of subalterns from this source, the 
need for leaders eventually forced it to give in.  Consequently, a marked 
difference in outlook rose between the junior and the senior ranks, and by 
World War II the latter could not be sure of the obedience of their 
ideologically oriented subordinates if they ordered a military move against 
Hitler.332 
 
I. NAZIFICATION OF THE ARMY 
Upon Hitler’s ascension to power, the French ambassador to Germany, Andre 
Francois-Poncet noted:  
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Two institutions, the German army and National Socialist party found 
themselves face to face…the question was, who would gain the upper 
hand in the new German state, the party or the army.333 
Hitler, upon assumption of power, realized his position was still extremely 
tenuous; he deftly positioned himself in favor of long standing army beliefs and 
reinforced the army’s desired position of a separate ‘state within the state’ through words 
and action. 
Hitler followed during his first few months of power…a policy of friendly 
gestures and marks of favor in order to win over the manifestly skeptical 
generals.  It was in line with the flood of lip service to nationalism, 
tradition, the Prussian spirit, ostentatious displays of respect for the person 
of the Reich President…and all those concepts which went with a 
conservative idea of the state.334 
Hitler guaranteed rearmament and the new government immediately began 
to fulfill this promise.  Little more was required to convince the officers 
that the new government was good for them and thus good for 
Germany.335 
To the gratification of the officers, a new army law of 20 July 1933 
abolished the jurisdiction of the civil courts over the military and did away 
with the system of elected representatives of the rank and file; the 
Vertrauensmanner whose very existence recalled the soldiers councils of 
1918.336 
Hitler went out of his way to express his respect for the traditions of the 
officer corps and his determination that its honorable place in the state 
should be maintained.337 
Although he [Hitler] did not actually remove them at once, he nevertheless 
radically undermined the suspicions of the military leaders, which were in 
any case halfhearted, proved him once more a master of psychological 
calculation.  He not only promised them the rearming of the Wehrmacht, 
the ‘steeling of youth and the strengthening of the will to defense by all  
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possible means’…but in addition presented his own counter demands in 
such a way that they merely seemed to fulfill the wishes of the 
Reichswehr.338 
Additionally, the Nazis and the army struck an unofficial agreement that resulted 
in a mutually beneficial relationship for both.  In the army’s eyes this agreement seemed 
to guarantee support for their aims and solidify their much sought after role/position 
within German society.  Thus, a ‘deal with the devil’ was struck that the army was intent 
on keeping and the Nazis under Hitler, only as long as it remained pertinent to their 
ultimate goal, and then they would undermine the army.  Hitler, in exchange, would 
become a strong proponent for rearmament and would demonstrate their commitment by 
removing a threat to the Reichswehr dominance of military affairs.339 
The consolidation of power by the Nazis depended upon an informal 
understanding with the military.  The latter would withdraw from politic, 
leave this field to the Nazis, and in return the Nazis would push an 
expanded rearmament program and guarantee the army a monopoly of the 
military function and autonomy within its own sphere.340 
These actions greatly influenced many within the senior leadership who viewed 
the Nazis as being able to deliver two crucial goals that had eluded the post-war army, an 
authoritarian government, and the support of the masses.  These two conditions, along 
with Hitler’s ‘twin pillars’ concept seemed to secure the military’s place in society and 
the reestablishment of the military’s “quasi-autonomous political power.”341 
The new regime appeared to promise what the old elites no longer felt 
capable of achieving alone: the nationalist integration of the 
overwhelming majority of the nation and the suppression of the rest.342 
This arrangement received explicit sanction in the spring of 1934 when the 
army agreed to support Hitler for President; Hitler acquiesced in the 
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suppression of Ernst Rohm and the S.A., who had dreams of replacing the 
Reichswehr with a mass, ideologically oriented, people’s army.343 
Hitler’s skillful maneuvering succeeded in pacifying the fears of many within the 
army’s senior leadership.  The prevailing views of Hitler’s relationship and benefit 
among the leadership of the army soon divided into opposing camps.  These conflicting 
views were best represented in the views of Werner Freiherr von Fritsch and Walther von 
Reichenau.344  
General von Fritsch represented the ‘old school,’ pre-war Prussian aristocratic 
values grounded in pre-industrial feudalism.  He viewed himself as intermediary between 
past and the future of the army.  He attempted to “build on the sure foundations of the 
past and adapting to the changed spirit of the times.”345 
Fritsch issued a string of orders and directives in which he combined an 
affirmation of loyalty to the new regime with a stress on the tested values 
of Prussian tradition.346 
Fritsch believed strongly in the Hitler’s ‘twin pillars’ approach and viewed the 
military cooperation and the formation of a National Socialist state as 
an alliance of old and new in which it was incumbent on the army to 
represent the standpoint and values of the traditional elite.347 
[The] armed forces command was, on the other hand, of the opinion that 
the world had changed and that the old elite would have to modify its 
values if it wanted to survive.  Werner Eduard Fritz von Blomberg and 
especially Reichenau thought more dynamically but also more 
unscrupulously.  Fritsch and his followers were representative of a 
continuity of old feudal values in a changed environment, whereas his 
opponents in the military embodied rather the continuity in military power 
politics.348 
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Reichenau, (who would become Hitler’s most political general)349, along with 
members of the armed forces command (Wehrmachtführung), disagreed with the 
approach of the more conservative officers lead by Fritsch.  They   
saw new balance of power and socio-political change as so profound and 
irreversible that they went beyond the claims of the old values and the 
tested ‘sure foundations of the past.350 
Through Reichswehr Minister Bloomberg and his closest adviser, von 
Reichenau…[Hitler had found] two partners who followed his course 
almost unconditionally.351 
These men lead by Reichenau and Blomberg were in favor of alliance and 
collaboration with the Nazi’s and had little use for 
traditional values and practices if that was the only way in which the 
military elite could be assured of a decisive influence in the new 
regime.352  
[They] had no scruples about sacrificing the holiest cows of Prussian 
tradition when it was necessary to preserve or strengthen the army’s 
political power.353  
National Socialism was not to him [Reichenau] any more than anything 
else, a matter of inner conviction, but the ideology of a political mass 
movement whose revolutionary élan he planned to harness, and at the right 
moment tame, to further both his career and the interest of the army.354 
Men who shared the same views as Reichenau and Blomberg (Wilhelm Keitel, 
Alfred Jodl and Walther von Brauchitsch) soon came to dominate key positions within 
the high command.  The overriding characteristic of these men was there quest for power 
and willingness to sacrifice tradition in their rush to embrace Nazi ideology for personal 
and military glory.  These men were blind to the true nature and ultimate goal of National 
Socialism and its impending plans for ideologically restructuring the military. 
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The Nazis were not content merely to eliminate the authority of the officer 
corps.  It was even more necessary to alter its fundamental character, to 
destroy it as an autonomous group positing its own values and goals.355 
Reichenau and his political adviser strove to make the army not merely an 
integral part of the new regime but equal partner of the party, with scan 
regard to traditional values.356 
Reichenau, when commenting on the alliance between the army and National 
Socialism, coined the slogan “into the new state, so as to maintain the position which is 
our due.”357  
Therefore, the senior leadership in an attempt to retain its privileged political 
status, which in turn preserved its professionalism, embraced the alliance with the Nazi’s 
in order to return Germany to their pre-war status as a European hegemon.  Hitler 
recognized this and cleverly parlayed the ‘two pillars theory’, while deftly manipulating 
those in power who he had not yet won over or eliminated.  This insured the military’s 
neutrality as he proceeded to eliminate political opposition; including former general 
Schleicher and other numerous high-ranking officers.  He consolidated his power for the 
day he would move against the generals by applying similar methods previously used 
against other segments of German society (Gleichschaltung). 358   
This is reason why the army looked on complaisantly, while the Nazis 
brutally crushed all opposition to the regime.359 
The domestic political conditions for the realization of the foreign policy 
objective of a great power appeared to have been met.  It was for these 
reasons that the leaders of the new Reichswehr supported Hitler in the 
consolidation of the new regime.  They looked on ‘neutrally’; i.e., 
supportively, as he first suppressed the left, then eliminated the bourgeois 
parties, centralized the political and administrative structure of the Reich 
and so appeared to realize the political ideal of an authoritarian, 
centralized state.360 
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Military leadership identified with national socialist on the object of 
foreign policy, that of attaining a position of hegemony for the Reich in 
Europe.361 
The former group represented by Fritsch and Beck saw their ability to confront 
Hitler severely limited, and upon the death of their leading advocate President 
Hindenburg, “who alone represented the state which the Reichswehr served,”362 were 
never able to recover when Hitler combined the offices of chancellor and president.   
The military’s elite’s position was weakened disastrously by Hitler’s 
accumulation of powerful political functions such as his assumption, upon 
Hindenburg’s death, of the presidency of the Reich, a role crucial to the 
army.363 
In addition, neutral officers who had tried to remain outside the political fray 
tended to identify increasingly with the beliefs and goals of Hitler.   
Significantly, even officers with little reason to be enamored of Hitler and 
his regime often shared many of the Fuhrer’s prejudices, or what they 
preferred to call his Feindbild, despite the obvious fact that many of their 
perceived ‘enemies’ hardly constituted an objective threat to the Reich.364 
With the combining of the offices of president and chancellor and his assumption 
of overall political power, Hitler now had the means to fulfill his ideological goals.  This 
would require the right leadership, his leadership (Fuhrerprinzip).  
Leadership was more important the higher any particular fascist 
movement rose.  It became vital for any serious attempt to take power.365   
The ultimate aim was the conversion of the nation into a socially 
coordinated and politically homogenous mass that acknowledged only one 
single will--the will of the leader and only one moral value: the nation.366 
By assuming political power, Hitler could then replace the old class system with a 
new integrated system with ties to “Fuhrer, Volk, army and race.”367 
                                                 
361 Klaus-Jurgen Müller, The Army, Politics and Society in Germany, 1933-45, 38 
362 Joachim C. Fest, The Face of The Third Reich, 237 
363 Klaus-Jurgen Müller, The Army, Politics and Society in Germany, 1933-45, 34 
364 Omer Bartov, HITLER’S ARMY: Soldiers, Nazis, and war in the Third Reich, 127 
365 Hagen Schulze, States, Nations and Nationalism, 492 
366 Hagen Schulze, States, Nations and Nationalism, 293 
367 Stanley G. Payne, A History of Fascism 1914-1945, 194 
83 
J. THE WAR YEARS, NAZI CONSOLIDATION OF THE MILITARY 1938-
1945 
The social metamorphosis of the armed forces worked by the Nazis 
proved equally significant for the fate of military tradition as a political 
force, rendering its meaning increasingly problematic The homogeneous 
cadre of Seeckt’s Reichswehr was dwarfed by the sixteen million strong 
Wehrmacht at the height of the war, the true nation in arms desired by the 
Prussian reformers of the early nineteenth century.  It was a people’s army 
filled with men from social groups that the bearers of military tradition 
had long excluded.368 
Over the previous five years, and due in large part to political and foreign policy 
success, Hitler had systematically removed senior officers and consolidated his authority 
in the Wehrmacht; and in 1938, dismissed Brauchitsch and assumed direct command over 
the army. 
The establishment of firm professional control over the army as the main 
military service was the most important outcome of the first year of Nazi 
rule.369 
It was at…the beginning of 1938 after the integrity of the officer corps had 
been sapped and its will to resistance weakened, that he [Hitler] threw 
aside the façade and, in a series of swift and brutal maneuvers, arrogated 
to himself personal command over the armed forces.370 
Every fresh success distorted his vision still further, until finally he felt 
himself infinitely superior to the despised generals. ‘This little affair of 
operational command is something that anybody can do.[Hitler]’371   
Central to his ideology was the reversal of the ‘unpolitical soldier’, which had 
characteristically represented the German military up until that time.  
As early as 1934, he [Hitler] told an interviewer that in his opinion, there 
was ‘absolutely no room for the unpolitical man.’372 
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Therefore, it was with this goal in mind that when the opportunity presented itself 
and feeling quite secure in his dictatorial position--that he justified his assumption of 
army command to further indoctrinate the Wehrmacht in order to facilitate his 
expansionist aims. 
‘It is the task of the Supreme Commander of the Army to educate the 
Army in a National Socialist sense.  I know no Army general capable of 
doing this.  Therefore, I have decided to assume supreme command of the 
Army myself.’373 
The public and military sentiment in Germany during the late 1930s in regards to 
war was quite different than the emotion of ‘August days’.  The former still vividly 
remembered the bitter sacrifices of that period, while the latter felt the country was not 
economically and material prepared for the undertaking.  
The mood of the nation during the Sudetenland crisis…[displayed] ‘no 
enthusiasm whatsoever for entanglement in war, morale was widely 
depressed’ and there was an ‘overall general war-psychosis’374  
Hitler’s adroit maneuvering--first politically and then militarily--delivered 
victories that far exceeded the expectations of even the most optimistic proponents of his 
policies.  This unimaginable success characterized the years 1938 to 1940, when against 
all advice from his generals, Hitler embarked on what seemed to be a reckless policy of 
confrontation and foreign aggression, only to emerge with greater victories on each 
successive occasion.   
The great military triumphs in the first two years of the war dispelled 
much of the gloom.375 
These early triumphs elevated Hitler even further, attaining the status of not only 
a godlike figure, but a military genius in the eyes of the masses and, up until then 
doubting members of the military.  Early successes allowed Hitler to progressively 
strengthen his administration of the military, increasing his intervention as the war 
proceeded. 
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Once the Munich accords were signed, the public mood rapidly changed 
into one of admiration for the Fuhrer’s ‘political skill.’376 
Their conviction in Hitler’s ideological arguments grew, following their 
triumphs in Poland and the West.377 
The great victories in the West led to increasing adulation of Hitler and 
consequently to a growing agreement with his ‘ideas.’378 
National pride in Germany’s military achievements combined with hopes 
for unprecedented prosperity from which everyone would gain.379 
Hitler first began to intervene in the preparation of military plans in the 
fall of 1938.  Once the war was on, however, and particularly after it 
began to go badly for Germany, Hitler extended his range of decision 
down to the most detailed tactical level.380        
Thus, the next phase of Hitler’s domination of the Wehrmacht and its adherence 
to the ideological goals set forth by National Socialism, more specifically those required 
for foreign conquest to satisfy the aims of ‘race and space’, were initiated.  Over the next 
several years, incoming members of the Wehrmacht who had been youngsters when 
Hitler assumed power in 1933 and had been influenced by the rampant nationalism of 
National Socialism since grade school possessed a greater doctrinal foundation.  
[the] struggles between two currents of strategy, one aiming at the 
reconstruction of unifying principles and the other at a new practice of 
war. By, 1942 a radically different notion of strategy and a transformed 
officer corps had come into existence.  The unified approach to German 
strategy devolved into two directions, the management of arms on the one 
hand and ideological “strategy” on the other.381 
A majority of new conscripts had spent several years absorbing fascist 
indoctrination in the Hitler Youth.  What remained to be accomplished was the  
 
                                                 
376 Omer Bartov, HITLER’S ARMY: Soldiers, Nazis, and war in the Third Reich, 179 
377 Omer Bartov, HITLER’S ARMY: Soldiers, Nazis, and war in the Third Reich, 128 
378 Omer Bartov, HITLER’S ARMY: Soldiers, Nazis, and war in the Third Reich, 149 
379 Omer Bartov, HITLER’S ARMY: Soldiers, Nazis, and war in the Third Reich, 180 
380 Samuel P Huntington, The Soldier And The State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military 
Relations, 119 
381 Michael Geyer, Makers of Modern Strategy, German Strategy in the Age of Machine Warfare, 
1914-1945, 528 
86 
reinforcement through military propaganda of extreme xenophobic and racist dogmas 
served to these youngsters on a daily basis in preparation for the upcoming war in the 
East. 
Thus, the fighting spearhead of the Third Reich was composed of men 
who had spent the formative year of their youth under National Socialism.  
This was of particular importance because the regime was first and 
foremost concerned with indoctrinating Germany’s young generation, both 
in the official educational system and especially within the ranks of the 
Hitlerjugend and the Arbeitsdienst.382 
Exposed to the influence of these new and still attractive institutions at a 
highly impressionable age, there is little doubt that the youths who were to 
become the Wehrmacht’s combat troops, were to a large extent, molded in 
the spirit of Nazism and prepared for the kind of war the regime was 
determined to wage.383 
In June of 1941, Hitler, after failing in the battle of Britain, turned his armies 
eastward for the culmination of his long held ideological battle against ‘Judeo-
Bolshevism and ‘Asiatic barbarism.’ Hitler’s unprecedented initial success against the 
West allowed crucial time for the intense ideological indoctrination of the Wehrmacht 
that was required for the brutal and barbaric war that would come to represent the Eastern 
Campaign.  Ideological indoctrination was to play a more vital role in the war in the east 
than it had in the West. 
Ideology did play a lesser role in the conquest and occupation of Western 
Europe.384 
In preparation for the impending war in the East, propaganda was radically 
intensified with the continued consolidation of National Socialism fascist ideology into 
the Wehrmacht as the primary goal. 
The Party is the carrier of the spiritual and the mental preparation for the 
present mighty task of our people.385 
Stereotypical views of the enemy [were] pumped into every German youth 
and soldier.386  
                                                 
382 Omer Bartov, HITLER’S ARMY: Soldiers, Nazis, and war in the Third Reich, 108 
383 Omer Bartov, HITLER’S ARMY: Soldiers, Nazis, and war in the Third Reich, 109 
384 Omer Bartov, HITLER’S ARMY: Soldiers, Nazis, and war in the Third Reich, 136 
385 Omer Bartov, HITLER’S ARMY: Soldiers, Nazis, and war in the Third Reich, 123 
87 
A deep ideological and racial abyss separated us from Russia; the aim 
must be to destroy European Russia.387 
Indoctrinations thus served the double purpose of strongly motivating the 
troops and greatly brutalizing them, for it legitimized both one’s own 
sacrifices and the atrocities committed against the enemy.388 
The indoctrination of the soldiers was of crucial importance in two related 
ways.  First, it taught the troops totally to trust Hitler’s political and 
military wisdom, and never to doubt either the morality of his orders or the 
outcome of his prophecies.  Second, it provided the soldiers with an image 
of the enemy which so profoundly distorted their perception that once 
confronted with reality, they invariably experienced it as a confirmation of 
what they had come to expect.389   
National Socialist war was war for the sake of social reconstruction 
through the destruction of conquered societies.390 
After initial pre-invasion indoctrination, the army on the Eastern Front was 
subjected to compulsory programming which increased during each of three significant 
phases; initial success, stalemate, and retreat.  During the first phase of the invasion, 
while things were progressing rapidly, army leadership felt the soldiers of the Wehrmacht 
were ‘still showing too much compassion for the enemy’ and thus, implemented 
increased attempts to indoctrinate soldiers through the use of propaganda.  A message 
delivered by Colonel-General Herman von Hoth to his troops typifies the effort to 
intensify the troops participation in the ‘brutalities deemed essential for the victorious 
outcome of this ‘war of ideologies.’”391 
More than ever, we are filled with the thought of a new era in which the 
strength of the German peoples’ racial superiority…and recognize our 
mission to save European culture from the advancing Asiatic barbarism.  
This battle can only end with the destruction of one or the other; a 
compromise is out of the question.392  
                                                 
386 Omer Bartov, HITLER’S ARMY: Soldiers, Nazis, and war in the Third Reich, 112 
387 Omer Bartov, HITLER’S ARMY: Soldiers, Nazis, and war in the Third Reich, 128 
388 Omer Bartov, HITLER’S ARMY: Soldiers, Nazis, and war in the Third Reich, 118 
389 Omer Bartov, HITLER’S ARMY: Soldiers, Nazis, and war in the Third Reich, 118 
390 Michael Geyer, Makers of Modern Strategy, German Strategy in the Age of Machine Warfare, 
1914-1945, 566 
391 Omer Bartov, HITLER’S ARMY: Soldiers, Nazis, and war in the Third Reich, 130 
392 Omer Bartov, HITLER’S ARMY: Soldiers, Nazis, and war in the Third Reich, 131 
88 
In the east, the soldier is not only a fighter according to the rules of 
warfare, but also a carrier of an inexorable racial conception [völkischen 
Idee] and the avenger of all the bestialities which have been committed 
against the Germans and related races.  The soldier must have complete 
understanding for the necessity of the harsh but just atonement of Jewish 
subhumanity.393 
This initial success served to verify Nazi concepts of racial inferiority and the 
superior ability of German military might.  Once again, Hitler’s bold leadership had 
seemed to fulfill the destiny of German imperialism dating back to the previous century. 
The retreat of the Soviet Union made possible the formation of a German 
dominated Mitteleuropa, a concept which can be traced back all the way 
to the original unification of Germany, if not indeed to the aspirations of 
German nationalist form the middle of the nineteenth century.394 
However, after initial success, the campaign stalemated; the five month battle of 
Stalingrad is historically viewed as the turning point from offensive to defensive warfare.  
During this period, the military introduced ‘educational officers’ and intensified their 
propaganda directed towards the troops in an attempt to increase the fighting capacity and 
ability of the army. 
The propagandistic reinterpretation of the disaster [of Stalingrad was] a 
powerful rallying point for even greater sacrifices.  Thus, the soldiers 
progressively retreated to an unreal, mystical, nihilistic world.395 
The Wehrmacht reacted to Soviet resistance by calls for a further 
‘fanaticization’ of its own troops by means of intensified indoctrination, 
and demanded even more ‘ruthlessness’ than previously, merely justified 
the claim that this was indeed a ‘war of ideologies’ where everything was 
allowed to achieve final victory.396  
The Wehrmacht was well aware of the powerful need for belief among 
soldiers living in conditions of constant danger, and catered to it with an 
endless stream of leaflets, brochures, speeches, radio talks…and all other 
forms of propaganda directed at the troops throughout the war.397 
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After the defeat at Stalingrad, the Eastern campaign degenerated into a life or 
death struggle for the German nation and propaganda was again intensified to increase 
frantic levels.  The ensuing belief in the regime’s propaganda kept the Wehrmacht 
fighting even after “their units disintegrated and military discipline broke down.”398 
In 1943, political indoctrination officers (National Socialistische 
Fuhrungsoffiziere NSFO) were introduced into the armed forces.  These 
officers were modeled upon the Russian political commissars and had a 
chain of command independent of the military hierarchy.399  
The tone of the army’s propaganda change from ecstatic to frantic, often 
verging on the hysterical; technology and skill were now to be 
increasingly replaced by devotion and fanaticism, rational thought by 
‘blind belief.’ Commanders were charged with instilling into the men, a 
new ideological fervor with which to combat the enemy’s superior 
numbers and machines, as well as the Red Army’s own apparent 
ideological motivation.400 
The Wehrmacht’s propaganda made a conscious and concerted effort to 
associate Hitler with God, to present ‘his mission’ as emanating from a 
divine will, and to tie his personal fate with that of the German Volk, 
indeed with the destiny of; Western civilization’ as a whole.401 
The Wehrmacht’s propaganda thus fed the troops with an ever heavier diet 
of religious images, portraying Hitler and the Nazi creed as God’s 
instruments charged with protecting German culture and blood, and 
communism as Satan’s servant, unleashed from hell to destroy 
civilization.402 
It was fear of vengeance for the Wehrmacht’s barbarities which made this 
propaganda so effective.403 
Letters home from the Eastern front illustrated the effect of propaganda upon the 
troops and the continued successful ideological indoctrination required by the bitter 
struggle.   
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The soldiers letters reflected the distortion of reality among the troops in 
two significant spheres: first the dehumanization and demonization of the 
enemy on political and racial grounds, with a particular reference to the 
Jews as the lowest expression of human depravity; and, second, the 
deification of the Fuhrer as the only hope for Germany’s salvation.  [They] 
regarded battle as a supreme test of character and manhood, as well as of 
racial and cultural superiority and a view of the war as a holy crusade.404 
As the fortunes of the Ostheer rapidly deteriorated, the troops ‘belief’ in 
Hitler did not falter, bur rather increased in direct proportion to the 
hopelessness of the situation.405 
For the troops at the front were the firmest of Hitler’s followers, and the 
least cynical about his ideology.406 
Increasingly during the last two years of the war, the troops at the front 
came to see themselves as the missionaries of the entire German nation, 
indeed of Western civilization as a whole.407 
The need of soldiers under constant danger of death for some kind 
spiritual support, provided in the Wehrmacht first and foremost by a quasi-
religious belief in Hitler, was thus powerfully demonstrated in this period 
of profound military and psychological crisis.408 
Toward the end of the war, when the objective situation became evidently 
hopeless, combat formations intensified their indoctrinational efforts even 
more in a desperate attempt to make up for their material weakness.409 
Nowhere was union of National Socialism and army ideals emphasized more than 
on the Eastern Front.  What had initially begun as a war to obtain Lebensraum, had over 
time, disintegrated into a war of genocide.  In order to stiffen the resolve of the front line 
soldiers, who bore the brunt of an increasingly precarious situation, the army leadership 
embarked upon an accelerated program of Nazification that only intensified in the last 
phase of the war. The battle on the eastern front was the fruition of National Socialism 
ideology of race war and the course of civil-military relations since the start of the 20th 
century, if not before.   
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This accelerating process of radicalization, visible at all levels of the 
Ostheer, reflected the true essence, not only of the war in the East, but also 
of the army as a whole, for In the Soviet Union the Wehrmacht finally 
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V. CONCLUSION 
The failure of Prussian-German army to undergo democratic civil-military  reform 
during the sweeping political and social changes of the 19th century created conditions in 
the 20th century in which the military embraced National Socialism in order to preserve 
its privilege position within the state.  This study has illustrated significant episodes from 
1806-1944 where civilian oversight and democratic control over the military were 
possible, but liberal and democratic forces failed to implement significant and lasting 
reform,   resulting in the military caste  becoming further entrenched in the self 
preservation of the ‘old status quo.’  The simultaneous social and political evolution of 
the 19th century resulted in the emergence of radical nationalism that coalesced prior to 
the First World War.  These contributing factors were galvanized by the political and 
economic carnage of post-World War I central Europe.  The interwar period and its chaos 
provided the breeding ground for National Socialism to appeal to diverse segments of the 
German population.  In turn, the German army, increasingly out of touch with the 
population attempted to co-opt the popularity of right-wing National Socialism to bind 
itself to the people.  The failure of liberal and democratic forces to integrate the military 
into constitutional mechanisms led to the horrific carnage and the subsequent catastrophe 
known as World War II.  This study illustrated the relationship of the soldier and the state 
in the darkest period of modern history  
Perhaps the events described in the preceding study have only an antiquarian 
interest, and some skeptics may suggests that the record of the past in a distant place has 
nothing to say to the present. Such an impression is mistaken, however.  The failure of 
liberal and pluralistic forces to enact sensible oversight over matters of policy, strategy 
and military affairs can have disastrous implications for more than merely national life.  
The story of Germany’s misfortune in modern history contains within it the central 
failures of  constitutional controls on military power, and radical nationalists and soldiers 
exploiting the forces of total war in society and the international system with catastrophic 




who wish to think soberly about the problems of force and statecraft, that is, the danger 
when ideology trumps the sound formation of strategy and destroys constitutional checks 
and balances.   
No other officer corps achieved such high standards of professionalism, 
and the officer corps of no other major power was in the end so 
completely prostituted.  Each chapter of the German story has its lesson 
and its warning.  The imperial experience shows the benefits of civilian 
control.  The republican period demonstrates the difficulty of achieving 
that control amidst political chaos.  World War I illustrates the disastrous 
results when military men assume political roles.  Nazi rule illustrates the 
equally catastrophic results when military warnings are unheeded and 
political leaders ride roughshod over the soldiers.  The variety of German 
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